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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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4 April 1986

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

INTERNATIONAL AID FOR EXPANSION OF RICE PRODUCTION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG (BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT) supplement in German 16 Jan 86 p 2

[Text] In an ever-increasing number of African nations, rice is becoming an important basic foodstuff. In order to guarantee the availability of sufficient rice to feed the population, which has come to appreciate this food source, new rice projects have recently been initiated in several African countries. New areas for cultivation have been created with irrigation systems or with tillage based on rainfall, rice mills are being built and methods of cultivation improved. Along with other industrial nations, the Federal Republic of Germany is also taking part in the development of rice cultivation in Africa by providing financial and technical assistance.

In the Sahel region, the cultivation of rice is developing especially in Mali and in the Republic of Niger. In May 1985, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank group granted Mali a credit amounting to \$19.5 million for the implementation of an important agricultural project in the area of Mopti. This project, which requires a capital expenditure amounting to a total of \$ 41.7 million, is aimed at the expansion of rice production and the improved utilization of livestock. The project is to be completed by September 1990. This was followed in the fall of 1985 by a loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Luxembourg, which amounted to 3.4 million European Currency Units (1 ECU = about DM 2.23) for the modernization of a rice mill. The AHT Agrar- und Hydrotechnik GmbH in Essen was included in the rehabilitation of rice mills in Mali.

At the beginning of 1985, the European Development Fund granted a subsidy of 11 million ECU's to the Republic of Niger for the development of modern rice cultivation along the Niger River in the territory of Daibery. The project provides especially for the creation of irrigation systems for an area of 400 hectares, where it will be possible to produce two annual rice harvests. The project is targeted for completion in December 1986. The Ministry for Agricultural Development and the Office National des Amenagements Hydroagricoles (Onaha) in Niamey are the project sponsors.

In Gambia, in May 1984, the first harvest was brought in within the framework of the Jahaly-Pacharr rice project, which was carried out with development aid (DM 9 million) from the FRG. The harvest surpassed expectations by almost 10,000 tons, so that this project can be regarded as quite successful. The harvest was adequate to meet almost one-third of the entire Gambian rice requirement. The Dutch firm Euroconsult B.V. in Arnhem has taken over responsibility for the project here.

In the fall of 1985, the FRG granted financial aid amounting to DM 25 million to the Ivory Coast for the development of rice cultivation on smallholdings in the north of the country. Moreover, with German aid two rice mills are to be renovated in Senegal; located in Ross Bethio and Richard Toll. Kloeckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH of Duisburg was brought into these projects as a consultant and undertook preparation of a feasibility study. Gauff Ingenieure GmbH and Co., Nuremberg and Frankfurt, has been entrusted with the consulting activities for a rice cultivation project in the Republic of Niger.

In Sierra Leone the successful entrepreneur Jamil Salid Mohamed recently commissioned Chinese experts to draw up an advisability study concerning the layout of a large rice plantation. This study recommends for the first stage of expansion the construction of two irrigation dams and the utilization of an arable area of approximately 3,200 hectares.

In Bansara, Cross River State, Nigeria, a 500 hectare rice plantation has been laid out. It is a joint undertaking of the government of Cross River State, Cross River Breweries Ltd. (CRBL) and MF Farms (Nigeria) Ltd. The latter firm is an agricultural management company with German participation.

In November 1985, the OPEC fund in Vienna granted Kenya in East Africa a credit amounting to \$ 4.55 million for the implementation of a rice development project. There the rice is to be cultivated by means of rain-based tillage.

In December 1984, the European Development Fund granted Madagascar a special loan of 1.63 million European Currency Units, which is to be used for the renovation of the center for seed rice in Marofarihy on the east coast of the island nation. The project, which is to be concluded by December 1989, provides among other things for the preparation of an arable area of 80 hectares, the reinforcement of the pump station as well as for the purchase of agricultural tools and equipment for treating the seed rice. The total capital expenditure is estimated at 1.95 million ECU's.

Several German companies are involved in the Betsiboka rice project in Madagascar, which is being carried out primarily by means of German development aid. Two Hamburg concerns, F. H. Schule GmbH Maschinenfabrik and Jos. Hansen und Soehne Aussenhandelsgesellschaft-mbH, have agreed to supply machines and equipment. Daimler-Benz AG, Stuttgart, will supply utility vehicles and Chemtech, Rosengarten, will supply fertilizer. Ludwig Suedbeck, Vechta, will also help to provide vehicles. Financial aid amounting to DM 32.8 million was provided by the FRG for this project, which has had an

auspicious beginning. Responsibility for consulting activities has been assigned to the above-mentioned AHT Agrar- und Hydrotechnik GmbH.

In May 1985, Egypt received a loan of \$139 million from the World Bank for the partial financing of a second agricultural development project, which will cost a total of some \$359 million. This project aims especially at improving agricultural productivity and increasing agricultural production in the seven rice provinces of El Fayoum, Behera, Kafr el-Sheikh, Gharbia, Damietta, Dakahlia and Sharkia.

12792  
CSO: 3420/21

BURKINA

BRIEFS

DPRK FRIENDSHIP BADGES--The schedule of the comrade president of the republic was very busy today. This afternoon, he received a delegation of the Burkinabe community residing in the Ivory Coast. President Thomas Sankara also received in audience the DPRK ambassador. Florence Zongo has the details: [Florence Zongo] The ambassador went to present to him some badges as a testimony of the friendship existing between our two countries. The 14,000 badges depict the struggles of Burkina, that is: environmental sanitation; the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR); the CDR's of the elders; the railroad battle project, the DOP [Political Indoctrination Speech]; and the battle for a green Burkina. These badges will contribute to accelerating the revolutionary process of our people, said Comrade Juste (Kiemtore), general coordinator of the presidency of the republic, in his words of thanks to the ambassador. [Excerpts] [Ouagadougou Domestic Service in French 1900 GMT 19 Mar 86] /8309

CSO: 3400/1273

## ROLE OF NATIONAL MILITARY POLICE OUTLINED

N'Djamena INFO TCHAD in French 3 Feb 86 pp 1-3

[Article: "First National MP Class Graduates"]

[Text] The first class of National Military Police last Saturday completed 3 months of training at the National Military Police Training Academy. Several members of government and of the National Advisory Council lent dignity to the ceremony presided over by Ndilondji Guelhor, minister-delegate to the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, whose mission is protection of the nation's war veterans and victims. First to take to the rostrum for the occasion was Youssouf Galmaye, commandant of the National Military Police, who defined the missions for which this corps will be responsible: "to participate in military defense missions which have risen to top priority in response to the Libyan occupation and, at the same time, to stand guard over the public safety, maintain law and order, and insure that the laws are enforced. This is why, after attending instruction centers or inter-force schools where the training is the same for all, they must attend the Military Police Academy which makes them into "soldiers of the law.

"They know that readiness, devotion, discipline, and respect for human dignity must be their cardinal virtues. Accordingly, this Saturday 25 January, they took an oath on their honor and their faith before the Attorney General to be ready to die in upholding the law.

"Furthermore, to mark their commitment and their fealty to the military virtues, we suggest that you, Mr Minister, here in the presence of his family, bestow the name of Ahmat Abderassoul on this class: he was a man who died a hero's death on the field of honor on 12 May 1983, the first man to command the Military Police, who perfectly symbolized all the values, human and military, of a Military Policeman. Let his memory shine always before them as a beacon and an inspiration in trying circumstances."

Turning to the officers and non-commissioned officers, he said:

"In this spirit, the National Military Police School, whose motto is 'Honor and Fidelity,' will, I am certain, produce men who are

technically competent and morally irreproachable to make our National Military Police force universally admired." ... "Accordingly, I would have you know that the entire country, united as one in the person of the President of the Republic, El Hadj Hissein Habre, supreme commander of the armed forces, reposes full confidence in you. You must be worthy of this trust: we are counting on your zeal to protect honest citizens and to succor those in peril, but also to deal summarily with lawbreakers when you know you are in the right, as well as to put an immediate stop to infractions and disorders and, in other cases, to hale those suspected of wrongdoing before the Public Prosecutor. We are relying primarily, though, on your determination to combat the Libyan enemy in whatever form he may take and wherever he may be.

"Before concluding, Mr Minister, I must publicly offer my heartfelt thanks to the attache of the French Armed Forces for all he has done to enable the Military Police to perform its missions. We are counting on him to help us even more. My thanks go as well to the officers and non-commissioned technical assistance officers of the French Gendarmerie who contributed so greatly, in the face of great difficulties, toward the success of this first graduating class. You, government ministers, and you, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chadien National Armed Forces, honored guests, ladies and gentlemen, have my thanks as well for having been so kind as to honor this ceremony with your presence. And, in conclusion, I pray God to take this class under His protection, to endow it with all that is true and noble, and imbue it with all things that may be salutary in guiding it on its delicate missions," Youssouf Galmaye concluded.

As for the National Defense Minister, he had this to say:

"Committed to the goal that has been set before us, to wit: to give our country a strong, effective army, one capable of protecting our country's territorial integrity so as to enable it to assert itself as a free nation, the government of the Third Republic, under the enlightened guidance of its illustrious leader, His Excellency El Hadj Hissein Habre, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, has paid the utmost attention to the training of the several different corps that make up that army, once the foundations for the Chadien National Armed Forces had been laid.

That is why you have witnessed several kinds of training provided in our land of friends and brothers, as well as the opening of several military training facilities on our soil. In view of its very specific requirements, it became necessary to endow the National Military Police with the tools to train men like these.

"Officially opened 3 months ago, the Military Police proudly presents to you today, as part of this ceremony, the first class of trainees it has graduated. In the presence of His Excellency El Hadj Hissein Habre, Commander of the Armed Forces, I now baptize the first 60 graduates of the Chadien National Military Police Academy in the

memory of that valiant soldier who died gloriously on 12 May 1983 in the battle of Ouniange Kebir, while defending his country against the invader. Ahmed Abderassoul was born sometime in or around 1952 at Faya Largeau. Joining the maquis back in 1970, he displayed the exceptional military qualities that won him appointment as head of the Provost-Marshall's office in 1982 at N'Djamena, leading a tank company in the battles joined by the patriotic forces at Guereda, Oum-Hadjer, and Bir-Goz, where he was wounded, and his appointment to command of the National Military Police Force in February 1983. Ahmed Abderassoul was also wounded three times in the fierce engagements of 1981 against the Libyan forces that invaded our country. May he rest in peace.

"In the present situation, where our country is struggling to break free of the bleak stagnation into which it has been plunged by the long years of war, every successful action is important because it is certainly the fruit of sacrifices made by the Chadian Government and its agents charged with bringing it to fruition. This is why I should like now to extend my compliments to all those officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men who have borne the heavy responsibility of instructing and officering this first graduating class we honor today. The work they have done is beyond price and the sole recompense they have received for it is, beyond any doubt, the knowledge that they have done their duty. Let them find in these words the expression of our country's deepest gratitude."

In conclusion, the Defense Minister noted that "The National Military Police Force is a many-faceted organization. In addition to its military mission, it will play a crucial role vis-a-vis the administrative and judicial authorities. It is also called upon to protect, aid, and succor all populations with which it comes into contact.

"The civics courses in which you have been immersed were designed to make you agents prepared to deal with all these problems: from now on, they will be yours to cope with every day."

6182

CSO: 3419/214

CHAD

NETHERLANDS, FAO DELEGATION OPENS TALKS ON AID

N'DJAMENA NOUVELLES NATIONALES in French 6 Feb 86 pp 1,2

[Text] A Netherlands delegation headed by Mr Van Vught, chief of the technical assistance office of his country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, joined by a delegation from the UN's Rome-based FAO, arrived in N'Djamena last Wednesday.

The delegation's prime mission is to meet with Chadian officials involved and discuss technical and financial assistance with Chad's National Cereal Grains Office (ONC), with a view to establishing an emergency grain supply. The Netherlands has contributed financially and materially to establishing the ONC.

As of yesterday, the delegation began interviews with the Director of International Cooperation at the Foreign Ministry. They also visited several neighborhoods in the capital, including the ONC and PAM (the UN's World Food Program) warehouses at Chagoua, the Chadian Ministry for Agricultural and Rural Development, and ONC offices as well as settlements for displaced persons within the city limits. On Thursday, it will meet with the General Secretary to the Office of the President, and make a call on the minister for agriculture and rural development. On Friday, the mission will go to Bokoro to inspect one of the ONC's many food and shopping centers scattered across the country.

The mission will round out its schedule on Saturday with a three-way meeting involving the Chadian government, the Netherlands delegation, and the FAO (in-country executor for projects funded by The Netherlands and aimed at amassing and storing an emergency food reserve. In the course of that meeting there will also be preliminary discussions on full cooperation between The Netherlands and Chad.

Actually, this is the first official Netherlands delegation to come to Chad in 10 years or so, although the two countries maintain diplomatic relations. (The Netherlands Embassy to Chad is located at Yaounde, in Cameroon).

In 1985, in the course of a mission to several European countries, National Disasters Minister Taher Abdel-Djelil visited The Netherlands, where pledges of more substantial and sustained help for agriculture and public health were soon forthcoming.

Chadian authorities certainly could try to generate new momentum behind a long-standing project of major importance to us. The Netherlands was in fact expected to fund a plan under which Chad would manufacture photovoltaic cells to collect and harness solar energy.

Such cells, manufactured in Chad, could find export markets in other Sahel countries where utilization of solar energy is an integral part of development programs.

Mr Van Vugt, an agronomist by profession, is already thoroughly familiar with Chad, where he served until 1975 on the European Technical Assistance program for the Lake Chad Basin Commission (CBLT). (ATP)

6182

CSO: 3419/214

CHAD

YOUSSOUF SEID TOURS LIBERATED BET AREAS

N'Djamena INFO CHAD in French 7 Feb 86 p 1

[Text] The prefect of Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti [BET], most of which is occupied by the invading Libyan troops and whose offices have been transferred to N'Djamena, has been touring the liberated zones in his prefecture for the past several days.

Youssouf Seid, who 48 hours ago was in Kalait, has been at Kouba Olanga since yesterday. The purpose of this tour is to assess the problems facing his constituents in regions in contact with the Libyan enemy, and to decide what measures need be taken to cope with the situation.

What he has found are primarily social problems, including health, food, and school attendance. The hard fact is that the displaced B.E.T. peoples are living under extremely precarious health and sustenance conditions, with almost no possibility of earning a living.

Schooling and health care are provided, if at all, by the Chadian Armed Forces (FANT), but the curricula, even in the primary grades, are not being followed, owing to the shortage of personnel and adequate facilities. That is how things are at Kalait, where there are, as of now, only three classrooms in operation.

As for food, the hostile conditions of the desert environment offer scant opportunity for meeting the needs of a large population, most of which has abandoned house and belongings to seek safety in places where the FANT is close by. This means permanent relief and assistance from the government to deal with hostility that does not come from nature alone.

The truth of the matter is that political issues are not least among the concerns voiced here and there during the tour Youssouf Seid is conducting in his prefecture. At the top of these concerns is security. Kalait and Kouba Olanga are only a few kilometers from the nearest Libyan positions, a situation that calls for vigilance on the part of our fellow-citizens living there.

Libya , by its presence and its actions, seeks to sabotage our policy of peace, unity, and reconciliation, as called for by our national government. Youssouf Seid calls on his administrators for unwavering support to the government in the form of constructive contributions, including those at the local branches of the National Union for Independence and Revolution.

6182

CSO: 3419/214

CHAD

BRIEFS

**DROUGHT THREATENS LAKE CROPS**--Again, the sword of Damocles hangs over the region. Despite the abundant rainfall that brought Lake Chad back to something like its former self and the stubborn determination of the region's peasants to defy the drought while taking the utmost advantage of what nature has to offer, the area surrounding the fertile polders of the lake are not likely to prosper. When the Lake waters rose again last August, there was hope once again, and the peasants rushed to recapture the polders. Yes, but what is happening now? For several days the Lake waters have been dropping fast. And, despite the peasants' determination, the fields are drying, the young green shoots of wheat are turning yellow, although this change is out of rhythm with their ripening cycle. Facing this situation, the peasants were beginning to hope for help from the Lake Development Corporation (SODELAC). The corporation has installed motorized pump to bring enough water to the fields enable the seedlings to grow. That, however, has brought another problem: fuel and the pro-rata contributions, insignificant though they may be, are more than the peasants can pay. Even less helpful is the replacement solution that would involve forming "chadoufs" (shifts), requiring the peasants to work around the clock. There is a stopgap solution at hand for the fuel shortage. The Red Cross League, through its agent at Bol, has given the peasants 100 sacks of corn, sales of which will suffice to pay for the fuel to run the pump. There you have an example worth following until SODELAC recovers sufficiently to resume full-time operations, which had been curtailed as a result of events that have so beset Chad. [By Mbodou Seid][Text] [N'Djamena INFO CHAD in French p 5 Feb 86] 6182

**30 VEHICLES FOR CHAD**--The Italian government this Tuesday 4 February delivered some 30 all-terrain vehicles to Chad, where they are to be used to transport food to victims of natural calamities. The secretary of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, Korom Ahmed, who accepted the transport vehicles from Ambassador Michele Martinez, deputy assistant-director of the special service for extraordinary intervention in Third-World countries. In brief remarks, the Italian diplomat said that his country assigns priority to helping with transport because it considers transport essential and strategically vital to economic development in Africa. In reply, the secretary of state assured him that the Chadian government is keenly aware of the real value of the aid this friendly country has never

ceased providing to Chad since the birth of the 3rd Republic. The gift accepted today by the Chadian government includes: 20 Model 90 PM 16 tank-trucks, 10 Model 260 PM tank trucks with trailers, one Model 90 PM 16 mobile repairshop trucks, and one workshop at N'Djamena. In other action, the Italian government will respond immediately to Chad's request for supplies of seeds, farm equipment, and aid in the form of rice to feed displaced persons, says a communique issued following the official acceptance of the gift. [Text] [N'Djamena, INFO TCHAD in French 4 Feb 86 p 2 ] [6182]

CSO: 3419/214

MALI

BRIEFS

**USSR DONATES AUDIOVISUAL EQUIPMENT--**Mali and the Soviet Union are today marking the 25th anniversary of the establishment of economic and technical cooperation agreements between them. It was within the framework of this cooperation that the Soviet Union this morning donated an important consignment of audiovisual equipment to the Ministry of National Education. This laboratory equipment worth 9 million CFA francs will be used by the CFP, the Vocational Training Center, to improve the quality of the training in that institution. The equipment was presented by (Cerbo Chernenskiy), economic counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Mali, on behalf of the ambassador. [Excerpts] [Bamako Domestic Service in French 1500 GMT 18 Mar 86] /8309

CSO: 3400/1273

MOZAMBIQUE

TERRORIST ACTIONS NEAR MAPUTO BLAMED ON SOUTH AFRICA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 10 Feb 86 p 1

[Commentary]

[Text] The explosion of two antipersonnel mines on the Costa do Sol beach in Maputo on Thursday was typical of the destabilization measures of which our country has been the target. This is a part of a strategy which has been pursued since our country gained independence, with the use of booby-trapped pens, the bombs in the Scala, the letter bomb which murdered Ruth First, booby-trapped radios, and explosive artifacts in vehicles.

These terrorist activities are purposely designed to victimize ordinary citizens.

The extent of the bestiality of these crimes is even clearer when we note that many of the artifacts and the premises chosen are those where children are likely to be the victims.

The adult and the child who were seriously injured on Thursday are a part of what the Republic of South Africa and the armed bandits define as the enemy--the people of Mozambique. All of us--men, women and children, young people and old--have been defined as the enemy. It becomes essential, therefore, that our vigilance be increased, with special concern for our children.

The terrorist actions are designed to affect the psychological stability of the citizens and to create a climate of insecurity in the capital of our country. These terrorist activities have coincided with serious domestic crises in the neighboring racist countries--this happened in Rhodesia in the past and it is continuing today in South Africa--and these events are occurring in a period of great danger for the political process in southern Africa. It is no accident, therefore, that the incidents being seen now coincide with a serious crisis in the South African government and parliament.

The reoccupation of part of Angolan territory by South Africa, the threat made by Pretoria to Botswana and Zimbabwe, the coup d'etat in Lesotho, the increase in the supply of arms and ammunition to the armed bandits in Mozambique--these are clear signals that the warmongering forces in Pretoria not only do not plan to keep their promises, but are also seeking to provoke an escalation of

aggression throughout the zone. In this way they are attempting to prevent the major successful activities carried out last year by the peoples of Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola to counter destabilization efforts from continuing.

They are further seeking to wipe out the memory of the important triumphs the South African people have already achieved in more than half a century of struggle, and in particular, in the last 2 years of rebellion.

Where Mozambique is concerned, at the end of last November, the authorities in Pretoria drafted a list of actions to be carried out either by the armed bandits or by specialized South African army units.

The main thrust of this escalation in the province of Maputo is the attack on the railroad system and the lines for the distribution of electrical energy. This escalation began in December with the sabotage of a major railroad bridge, and it has continued with regular attacks on the railroad line (trains) between Maputo and Swaziland and sabotage of the electric power lines between the port of Nkomati and Maputo.

The assassination of defenseless individuals in the outlying areas of Maputo and the explosion of some artifacts intended to injure civilians complete this picture of the terrorist actions ordered by the South African authorities.

In connection with these deeds, it is important to recall a passage in the daily record of the armed bandits which was captured in Casa Banana in August of last year and which has now been made public by our government. Brigadier Van Tonder said, in the column referring to 18 and 19 August 1984, that "as to the equipment for urban guerrilla warfare, we will send it, but not all of the types of material requested, because there are some bombs assembled in the RSA, and this compromises us in terms of the Incomati Agreement. Therefore we will send clock bombs and temporary mechanisms for explosive projects."

Thus the explosions on Thursday were not an isolated instance. They are a part of a whole campaign to destroy stability launched by the RSA against the RPM and its people. We are faced with decisions adopted by the South African authorities on the highest level. We are dealing with a very specific type of terrorism--state terrorism. Today there can be no doubt that the South African state is terrorist, in the broadest sense of the word.

The polemic concerning state terrorism is a burning issue in the Western countries. International news agencies have given broad coverage to punitive measures, ranging from military threats to the application of economic sanctions against those states accused of responsibility for terrorist acts.

The complacency with which these same Western countries view the terrorism of the South African state is significant.

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CSO: 3442/143

MOZAMBIQUE

GORONGOSA RETURNS TO NORMAL AFTER OFFENSIVE

Lisbon AFRICA HOJE in Portuguese No 8, Jan 86 pp 26-27

[Text] The peasants who were liberated from the hands of the armed rebels of the Mozambique National Resistance by the offensive mounted by the joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean armed forces in central Mozambique have recently begun to pour into the district's principal town, where they have been welcomed by the authorities. Two camps have been set up on the outskirts of the town, which already has a population of 8,000. Officials are making efforts to build houses and purchase food and clothing for the residents.

Many of the people who show up at the site are naked. Some cover themselves with leaves or bark and others with pieces of South African parachute fabric. One of the more bizarre practices engaged in by the rebels was to use scraps of South African parachutes as a medium of exchange. Weapons were dropped to the rebels from parachutes, which were later cut up and given to the local residents in exchange for food. The peasants reported that if they refused to make such "deals", they were assaulted or even killed. The local people call this fabric "parachuto", a corruption of the English word "parachute". The Portuguese word paraquedas is unknown to them. The South African influence on the rebels extended even to the terminology they used.

A woman in one of the camps, still dressed in pieces of parachute fabric, told AIM that she hadn't worn regular clothes for 4 years. The rebels had blocked all means of communication, thereby cutting off trade and keeping the rural population of Gorongosa from obtaining supplies.

Local authorities have given all the refugees clothes. New capulana cloths made by Textafrica, a textile factory in Chimoio in the central province of Manica, has been distributed to everyone. Other apparel has come from the Department of Natural Disaster Prevention and Relief (DPCCN). When AIM visited one of the sites--known as Macudze--we saw a bonfire in which people were burning the leftovers of parachute fabric and the bark and leaves that used to constitute their clothing.

Food is being provided by the DPCCN and brought to Gorongosa by road from the port of Beira. Convoys of half a dozen trucks escorted by military vehicles make the trip two or three times a week. Part of the trip takes them over the highway that links the city of Beira with Zimbabwe. There are no problems on

that stretch. The final 60 km, from Inchope to Gorongosa, is in poor condition. The rebels destroyed two bridges there in 1984 and dug up some portions of the roadbed in order to slow down the traffic and make it easier to attack passing trucks.

Now there are few military problems along the road, but trucks must avoid the chuckholes and go through large pools of water. This is not the rainy season, so the rivers are low and can be forded. The damaged bridges are being repaired quickly; otherwise the coming rains will make it impossible to cross.

Two teams from CEDTA, a construction company, are starting work to repair the Inchope-Gorongosa road and rebuild the bridges. The packed-earth road connecting northern Gorongosa is being improved at the same time. That route passes near "Casa Banana," formerly the MNR's main base, which was captured at the end of August. Its improvement will enable supplies to be brought to the families now living in and around the ruins of Casa Banana.

Specialists in town planning are in Gorongosa studying the housing problem and choosing possible sites for construction of new villages. Technicians from the Chimoio Agrarian Institute have been arriving in Gorongosa to work on rehabilitating the collective farms in the district and decide what should be planted during the next agricultural campaign. District health services are being built up. A vaccination campaign is underway and two Mozambican doctors have been assigned to the Gorongosa District Hospital. A military nurse told AIM that malaria, dysentery, and other intestinal problems are the most frequent complaints.

Meanwhile, military operations continue in the mountains near Gorongosa and the sound of gunfire can be heard from the town. Groups of rebels who escaped from Casa Banana have hidden in the hills and are being pursued by the joint forces.

With the fall of Casa Banana and the total destruction of the MNR network north of Sofala, the security situation in the district of Gorongosa is improving. The rebels now travel in groups of no more than 10 and find themselves unable to launch any significant operation. Truck drivers have told AIM that the rebels rarely attack vehicles now and when they do, they run off as soon as they are met with firepower.

This is a new situation resulting from the joint Mozambique-Zimbabwe military offensive. Before, ambushes were always occurring on the Inchope-Gorongosa road and it took a week for convoys to complete the trip. Now the road is considered "reasonably safe."

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MOZAMBIQUE

#### ANALYSIS OF NATION'S WARTIME ECONOMY

Lisbon AFRICA HOJE in Portuguese No 8, Jan 86 p 42-44

[Article by Ricardo Romao: "An Economy at War"]

[Text] If hopes were high following the signing of the Nkomati nonaggression pact between Mozambique and South Africa on 16 March, 1984, then the disillusion for the Mozambicans is that much greater, especially for President Samora Machel. More than a year has passed and the country's economic problems are even more serious than they were. This is not only due to the activities of the ubiquitous Renamo rebels--whom Pretoria agreed to cease helping--but is also a consequence of the effects of the drought that ravaged a major part of the African continent and was keenly felt in Mozambique.

To this must be added the corruption at various levels of society and the indolence of many Mozambicans. President Machel criticized these tendencies in a recent speech, when he stressed that "not all the problems can be blamed on the rebels."

His pragmatism led him to attempt an approximation with the West, especially with the United States, once the failure of the attempt to increase South Africa's role--either in containing Renamo's activity or developing Mozambique's industry and agriculture--became evident.

Two contracts in the tourism sector with the Lonrho company and with Johannes Petrus Henn--the latter involving the creation, with the Mozambique Tourism Office, of Mozatur, a private company with \$140,000 capital--plus an increase from 47,000 to 52,000 in the number of miners authorized to work in South Africa are plainly not enough to provide the economic growth and improvement in Mozambican living conditions that Maputo desires. Still, the Mozambican Government would not feel very comfortable if there were to be greater economic interdependence with Pretoria, given the racial tension and wave of repression currently being experienced in the RSA.

Therefore, beginning in 1985, Maputo embarked on a campaign to open the country to foreign investment and attract industrial and agricultural enterprises, but always with the proviso that national independence be respected and that the project be consistent with its development policy targets.

The foreign investment law that was implemented contains a guarantee that part of the profits may be transferred abroad, and provides for tax exemptions. The Government guarantees the safety of foreign investments and says it will protect them. It gives assurances that nationalization would take place only in exceptional cases and with appropriate indemnification and transfer of the indemnity payments abroad in freely convertible currency.

Among the incentives available to foreign investors are exemption from Customs duties on raw materials and other components for the manufacture of products for export. Furthermore, the new investments will be exempt from taxes for periods ranging from 2 to 10 years, and amounts equal to three times the sums spent on training Mozambican workers may be deducted on the tax return.

Mozambique, says one government official, assigns priority to investments in agriculture and those that have a direct and positive impact on the balance of payments. This policy has already born fruit--the first of a series desired by President Machel to improve the lot of the Mozambican people who have suffered so much at the hands of man and Mother Nature.

For example, a petroleum exploration agreement was signed with Amoco (US), and an agricultural and mining (gold) agreement with Lonrho, of Great Britain. The United Kingdom will invest 10 million pounds in 1986 to rebuild the railroad between Beira and Zimbabwe, which is of vital importance for shipments of exports from what used to be Rhodesia. The line has been one of Renamo's main targets.

Switzerland, too, has increased its presence in this country, and Mozambique is the nation which has been most benefited from Swiss investments in African nations, at the bilateral cooperation level. Beginning in 1986, Switzerland will be giving courses in the utilization of Mozambique's water resources. Almost \$800,000 has been allocated to this activity for the next two years.

But all the investments that are being increased (we will discuss Portugal later on) and the international assistance in combating the effects of the drought, the hunger, and the misery--which must have claimed hundreds of thousands of victims in recent years--are not enough to offset the drain on funds caused by the need to confront the rebels of the Mozambican National resistance, which continues to enjoy South African support--if not at the official level, at least in large sections of the radical right and within the RSA army.

Symptomatic of this state of affairs is the fact that 42 percent of the general budget of Mozambican Government is earmarked for military spending. Specifically, the proposal submitted to the 14th session of the legislature, held in December, 1985, calls for total spending of 26.7 billion meticals (approximately 106.8 million contos), with defense and security getting 11.3 billion of that. Revenues are forecast to total 19.5 billion meticals, 500 million less than in 1985.

The government's program for the new year is based on an anticipated growth of 13 percent in economic activity, in contrast to the drop of 20 percent recorded in 1985 over the 1984 level. Mozambique's minister of finance says that the principal objectives of the 1986 plan are combating Renamo, increasing foreign exchange receipts, and improving the supply of basic commodities to the population--perhaps by as much as 40 percent. Other goals are to increase GNP by 7 percent and raise exports by 6 percent. However, imports are projected to increase by 12 percent, which is an important factor in the anticipated deficit.

In the area of agriculture, efforts are already underway to develop the Gorongosa region, the most fertile part of Sofala Province. An initial appropriation of 142 million meticals has been made, vast areas of farmland have been made available for foreign investment, and a campaign has been launched to help the rural residents who have been so severely affected by the drought. It is hoped that the utilization of foreign investment can help cotton to regain its important position in the balance of trade.

And, obviously, in the middle of all this we cannot forget the impact of the Cabora Bassa dam, that work of art for which Portugal was responsible.

Despite current difficulties and although 1986 will be another difficult year--what will future years be like? Is there a reasonable basis for hope? Everything depends on the pragmatism of the Maputo Government and President Machel, on the degree of confidence he can manage to generate in the minds of foreign businessmen, and on the Mozambican people's gaining a greater degree of discipline and spirit of initiative. Everything depends, too, on nature, which has been such a wicked stepmother. The best of man's intentions can achieve nothing in the face of superior forces.

Is there a reasonable basis for hope? Hope is the last to die...but the problem of Renamo must be solved. The Maputo Government cannot hide its head in the sand like an ostrich, and pretend that Renamo does not exist without running the risk of suffering new major vexations that, in the last analysis, further aggravate the suffering of a population that has been through so much already. This problem must be resolved, either politically or militarily, but it is a problem that, although it most concerns the Mozambicans themselves, cannot be dissociated from the entire Southern African context.

What we really have here is an economy that is at war with both men and nature.

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MOZAMBIQUE

COOPERATION WITH EEC REVIEWED

Lisbon AFRICA HOJE in Portuguese No 8, Jan 86 pp 40, 41

[Text] The European Economic Community will contribute 145 million ECUs (20.3 million contos) to cooperative programs for Mozambique during the next five years. Antonio Marongiu, EEC representative in Maputo, said at a press conference that the contribution would take the form of aid without repayment of either interest or capital.

However, unofficial sources within the Mozambican Government appeared uneasy about the sum appropriated by the EEC to Mozambique's economic development plans. The nation is due to ratify the Lome III Convention this year.

Accompanied by Aranda da Silva, Mozambican minister of domestic trade, the EEC delegate analyzed the joint efforts made in the context of EEC support between 1978 and 1984. He stated that the work of scheduling food aid for 1986 and subsequent years is already underway.

With Mozambique's accession to the Lome Convention, "the food aid programs will be integrated gradually into the broader program of cooperation between Mozambique and the EEC, the priority objectives of which have been defined as increasing agricultural production and achieving a dependable food supply," the European diplomat said. He added that these priorities fit in with the support given by the EEC to the food security programs developed under SADCC, of which Mozambique is a member state.

Giving an account of the programs under which food aid has been provided to Mozambique, Marongiu said that a total of 66 million ECU in assistance was given between 1978 and 1984. He announced that this year the EEC plans to furnish Mozambique 50,000 tons of grains and 4,000 tons of dry beans along with other products, including 300 tons of vegetable oils, 300 tons of powdered milk, and 100 tons of butter. For its part, the EEC Commission--working through nongovernmental organizations--will send Mozambique 2,200 tons of grains, 150 tons of dry beans, and 595 tons of miscellaneous products such as vegetable, oil, powdered milk, butter, and dried fish.

The first products furnished directly by the EEC, which are considered as part of the "regular" assistance, will be distributed according to the plans drawn up by the Mozambican Ministry of Domestic Trade. As in previous years, the proceeds from the sale of those products will be used to finance agriculture and livestock development projects.

Referring to the emergency programs, the EEC delegate announced that the EEC decided in December of last year to appropriate 4.5 million ECU for the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, Tete and Zambezia, which have been devastated by the drought of the past 3 years and where the population still suffers the consequences of that disaster.

Mr Marongiu also made brief mention of the EEC's financing of development projects since 1976, with special reference to the cannery in the city of Beira in central Mozambique, support to small fishermen along the Mozambican coast, support for the seed potatoe selection project, and the regional project to eradicate the tsetse fly.

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MOZAMBIQUE

#### WORKERS ORGANIZATION PROVIDES SELF-DEFENSE TRAINING IN NIASSA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Feb 86 p 3

[Text] Thousands of workers in the enterprises located in the province of Niassa have now been trained in self-defense and the defense of their production units against attacks by armed bandits. The OTM [Mozambique Workers Organization] has 3,900 members in these enterprises, some of whom will shortly receive their cards, according to Inacio Tome Magaia, provincial OTM secretary in Niassa.

This official, who spoke at a meeting held several days ago in Lichinga to assess the activities carried out by the democratic, mass and vocational organizations during the past year, added that the OTM has nine trade union branches in Niassa. The councils for this workers organization have now been established and confirmed in 11 districts.

"As a result of the work done by the OTM," Inacio Magaia said, "14 voluntary labor campaigns were carried out in the province last year, with more than 5,000 workers participating." Studies made by the OTM last year and made public in the course of this meeting show that in the city of Lichinga alone, there are 1,500 working women and 2,450 young workers.

At the meeting held to assess the activities pursued by the democratic, mass and vocational organizations, the tasks for this year were approved.

The secretary of the Niassa Provincial Party Mobilization Committee, Fernando Jorge, presided at the meeting.

Moreover, a trade-union training course for the heads of the various activity sectors in the OTM in Niassa began recently in Lichinga.

There were 30 participants, some of whom are heads of trade union committees, while others head health and safety commissions and control and discipline committees at the enterprises in the city of Lichinga.

For 1 month, the participants will study subjects connected with political economics and the trade-union movement, and they will also hear talks on the OTM and the importance of labor health and safety.

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MOZAMBIQUE

MACHEL OPENS YOUTH CONGRESS IN MAPUTO

MB181517 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0825 GMT 18 Mar 86

[Speech by Samora Machel, chairman of the Frelimo Party and president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, at the opening session of the Second National Conference of the Mozambican Youth Organization at the 4th Congress Hall in Maputo--live]

[Excerpts] Comrade members of the Frelimo Party Central Committee, members of the People's Assembly Standing Commission, members of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Mozambique, dear delegates to the Second National Conference of the Mozambican Youth Organization [OJM], members of the diplomatic corps, esteemed representatives of friendly youth organizations, invited guests: As we begin the proceedings of the OJM Second National Conference, we salute and congratulate the entire Mozambican youth from Rovuma to Maputo Rivers for organizing this meeting of reflection, this get-together.

In recent months, we have been able to confirm our prediction that the enemy would define this OJM Second National Conference as a target of his criminal attacks. A number of young men, OJM activists, have fallen under the murderous bullets as they were devotedly carrying out their duties to prepare for this meeting. By reaffirming with their blood our people's unwavering determination, these activists have joined the other heroic patriots who, in areas where enemy action is mostly felt, have given the best of themselves for Mozambique. We are speaking about the bravery of those who defend the fatherland with arms in hand. We are also speaking about the abnegation and generosity of a number of anonymous heroes in everyday life.

Present here are representatives from friendly countries and organizations. We say to all of them: Welcome to this OJM Second National Conference! [applause] We salute them all for the fraternal and militant solidarity which they have once again come to demonstrate. Through them, we should like to send warm greetings to the revolutionary, progressive, and democratic youth worldwide, who are fighting for the peace, liberty, democracy, and social justice that are mankind's common aspirations. We should particularly like to salute the young men of East Timor, Western Sahara, Palestine, Chile--young men who in extremely difficult conditions, have been fighting for national independence and the

overthrow of fascist tyrannies. We salute the young men of Namibia who, arms in hand, are fighting against South African colonialism for national independence. We should especially like to salute the determined and heroic young men of South Africa. In South Africa today, it is the young men who are on the frontline of mass actions against the odious system of apartheid. They have been confronting the fascist regime's machine of terror with empty hands, armed only with the certainty of victory. South African young men of all races and origins are already building a new nation free from races and tribes--a nation where children cease to be white or black and become just children.

The main achievements that we have carried out, the important steps that we have made along the path of development, the society of justice and equality being experienced in our country, in brief, our program for building socialism in Mozambique, are the motives for imperialist aggression. All these are its targets. We brought about an alternative civilization in a region that was dominated by colonialism in its most barbarous and inhuman forms. We made flourish the values of liberty and justice in a region where the principal imperialist bulwark, South Africa, persists in imposing its oppressive, racist, and exploitative regime.

For imperialism, for the apartheid regime, to destroy us means to destroy a threat which is not measured by bombs, tanks, missiles, or military ability. Our principal weapons, the weapons which Pretoria and imperialist circles fear most, are represented in this hall. We find them here at this 4th Congress Hall. [applause] Here we see the unity of the Mozambican people from Rovuma to Maputo Rivers. Here is our form of life. Here is an example of our ability to join our intelligence and potentialities in order to discuss and solve our problems. Here is our democracy. Here we find the image of a newly born nation which is deeply rooted in the traditions of our people's struggle and confident in the future. Here we have our sophisticated weapons that the enemy so much dreads. We are not a threat as far as war is concerned. We are a threat as far as peace is concerned. [applause] Our achievements are targets that the enemy wants to destroy at all costs.

During the armed struggle for the national liberation, we learned the importance of correctly defining the enemy. Today, we once again observe the importance of the definition. Imperialism is not an abstract entity. It is a system of domination of peoples and it is based on the exploitation of man by man and the pillage of nations' resources. It acts directly, as is the case with military and political acts of aggression. It also acts indirectly, as is the case with economic blackmail and cultural subversion.

The political transformations that took place in our region in the past 2 decades have put at stake the imperialist hegemony in our zone. After the independence of Zimbabwe, racist South Africa remained the sole bastion of imperialism in our region.

The defeat of colonialism in Mozambique and the popular nature of our independence resulted in the withdrawal of our country from the system of political domination of imperialism. In Mozambique, the first objective of imperialism

was to reverse the situation and once again place our country under its domination. In Mozambique, imperialism did not find a political force that it could use as its agent in this process. Therefore, the idea of once again bringing Mozambique back to the imperialist system could only be attained through one way. Which one? Through the destruction of our own independence.

Lisbon has also emerged as the base of aggression against our country. In the context of the imperialist aggression against our country, armed banditry is simply an instrument and a tool to murder, to destroy, and to terrorize. Banditry constitutes the main form of external aggression against our country, the aim being to destroy the organized way of life, mainly in the rural areas so as to hinder the process of socialization of the countryside. The aim is to prevent the struggle against underdevelopment, which we have successfully initiated, and to impose a continued situation of famine, and misery in order to bring about internal dissatisfaction, division, and confusion so as to put people's power and socialism at stake. The aim is to spread terror, panic, and insecurity among the people, and to paralyze the activities of the grass-root organs of our power. The aim is to maintain South Africa's economic domination of southern Africa and prevent the SADCC from being visible.

In addition to armed aggression, the enemy uses external economic aggression, mainly through boycott and maneuvers to destabilize the economy. Armed and economic aggressions are not only aimed at further aggravating the problems that our people have to face in their daily lives, but also extending the room of maneuver of the internal reactionaries. It is no longer a question of destroying our model of society. For imperialism, it is necessary to impose its own model, namely individualism, greed for profit, unbridled search for the satisfaction of personal ambition, and contempt for collective needs, based on the belief that man is measured by what he owns rather than what he is capable of doing for society. Black market, speculation, and the ploys represent the spearhead of infiltration of that model.

Dear Friends, our main task is the defense of the fatherland. The fatherland is the most precious asset to us all. The Mozambique Armed Force-FPLM represent the first and main frontline of the defense of our fatherland. The participation of the youth in the defense of the fatherland and revolution has been decisive. The adherence of the youth to the call by the fatherland to liquidate armed banditry has been enormous and enthusiastic.

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#### NATION'S YOUTH COMPLAIN OF POLITICIZED LIFE

Lisbon AFRICA HOJE in Portuguese No 8, Jan 86 pp 33, 34

[Text] With downcast eyes and twisting his hands nervously, the young Mozambican stammered as he asked a favor of the Portuguese "cooperator" who was leaving for Lisbon on vacation. As though he were asking for the world, he said "I would like you to do me a big favour...Bring me a Chico Fininho record." Whether physically maimed by hunger or war, or healthy and able-bodied, young Mozambicans have the same longings as adolescents anywhere else.

Although little has been said about Mozambican young people, they make up more than half the population--6 million are under 21--and they bear a major share of the country's burden of difficulties and sacrifices.

Thousands of young people in Mozambique have survived the various armed conflicts that have bloodied the country during its 10 years of independence, but they have been marked for life. A mine has blown away an arm, bombing has disfigured a face. Others, due to the serious droughts that have devastated southern Africa in recent years, have been affected mentally by malnutrition.

But whether urban or rural, the faces of these young people light up when they talk about love, music, or clothes and they frown whenever the generation gap is discussed. ~~Some~~ some protest that there are no more records of traditional music. Others lament the absence of the latest international rock hits. The possibility of international stars like Michael Jackson coming to Mozambique excites them.

Just thinking about the jeans and tennis shoes they see on the cooperators or the emigrants from South Africa thrills them. They sigh over the miniskirts and plastic sandals in the fashion magazines that reach Mozambique, several months late, in the hands of a foreigner. Tastes are about the same in the country, although the youth there prefer the stylish lengths of fabric wound around the body. But in either case a radio that would enable them to hear music would be a wonderful gift and a record player absolute heaven.

## Saturday Night Fever

Saturday is a very special day for all city dwellers. Saturday without a party is just not Saturday. One starts making contacts in the middle of the week to find out who is going to sponsor the festivities. Not the two Brazilian cooperators, enthusiastic about the samba or forgotten hits that may go back as far as the "Model T." Nor the Scandinavians and Germans because, although they usually offer plenty of food and drink, their dance floors never get really lively. The best parties, without any doubt, are given by the Mozambicans, in whose homes the food may be meager but one can jump and twirl around till dawn. A friend brings another friend, the uninvited invite themselves, and the hosts--of whatever nationality--soon find the house overflowing.

But man does not live by music alone, and the shortage of books and magazines is keenly felt and strongly criticized by both urban and rural youth. They particularly lament the absence of books by Eca de Gueiroz (especially well-known in Mozambique) and Gabriel Garcia Marquez.

In the cities, it is common to hear young people complain about the foreign exchange restrictions that keep them from taking correspondence courses in foreign languages, electrical work, or electronics.

Living in a strongly politicized world, in the midst of conflicts that--one way or another--always affect them personally, they show a significant involvement and interest in political issues, even when they are indifferent as to a political party.

Because television is of poor quality and is broadcast for only a few hours a day, people have more time for each other and discussions on "the sex of the angels" and other matters frequently go on until the wee hours of the morning. Topics vary--the nation's problems, government rulings, some article in the local press, or the music of the Portuguese singer Jose Afonso.

Sometimes all these aspirations take them too far away. Prostitution, unwed motherhood, and robberies are part of the young Mozambican scene. When found guilty, they are sent to re-education camps in the south of the country. There they find all kinds of difficulties, worse than the problems in the cities. When they come back they are almost always angry, but since at their age all passions are fleeting, they end up going back to their routine and it is not unusual to find them, later, working for the government or even for the party--traveling abroad from time to time but always returning to their native soil.

Infatuated as they are with modern fashion, habits, and customs brought from overseas, almost all of them argue with their parents. The stubborn "old man" and "old lady" who still spank their children--or even use the strap--to moderate filial excesses are still a constant element in the traditional society. But, once they pass the peak of adolescence, the majority of the youth return peacefully to the bosom of the family and end up amicably accepting the suggestions of their elders.

In a world that has been particularly marked by economic difficulties, one finds a certain amount of searching for "El Dorado" in a mixture of desire for adventure and wealth. There are many who place their hopes on leaving for South Africa, planning to come back some day with their pockets full but aware of the human restrictions they will find under apartheid.

It is particularly difficult for young women who are earning their living or attending college, either in Mozambique or abroad. They have to deal with unequal treatment of women and confront a fiercely masculine world that uncompromisingly defends its prerogatives. But these young women hold a trump card: the shortage of male white-collar workers and laborers because of the war. The women more easily gain access to jobs that in Europe are still monopolized by men. So we find them driving tractors, wielding scissors at a barber shop, handling military recruitment, or even managing a farm where all the workers are men.

Although it has its negative aspects, all this social ferment among young Mozambicans contains some very positive elements while local society modernizes rapidly within a situation that is developing at a cosmopolitan pace that we rarely see in the West.

And despite all their restlessness, the truth is that the overwhelming majority of the hands that carry weapons to defend the country and its population are young ones.

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MOZAMBIQUE

COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN GAZA PROVINCE GAINING STRENGTH

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Feb 86 p 3

[Article by Bento Niquice]

[Text] In the past 2 years, the cooperative movement in the province of Gaza has been promoted enthusiastically, with an effort to find all the mechanisms needed to eliminate and correct, once and for all, the situation of practically total neglect to which the majority of our cooperatives seemed to be condemned. This problematical situation was characterized by the constant misappropriation of funds by some workers, which led to or threatened the bankruptcy of some cooperatives. This, in brief, is the conclusion reached by the participants in the last provincial consumer cooperatives seminar held a few days ago in the city of Xai-Xai.

Faquir Bay, the provincial representative of the AGRICOM [Agricultural Products Marketing Company] and the interim provincial domestic trade director, who has taken the place of the unfortunate Domingos Chiconela, who died last year at the hands of the armed bandits, presided at the seminar. It was the second of its sort to be held in the history of the cooperative movement in this province. Participants included the presidents of the consumer cooperatives, representatives of the banks, the party and the government, as well as other groups involved in this sector.

At the meeting, an assessment was made of the activities carried out since the last such meeting, held at the end of the first half of 1984. The main focus at the meeting was on analysis of the main activities connected with the growth of the cooperative movement in this province.

The participants in the meeting concluded with satisfaction that, despite some of the difficulties which always characterize life in this sector, it has in praiseworthy fashion been able to cast off the tragic burden of the financial crisis which prevailed in almost all the consumer cooperatives. The fact is that this problem was discussed at length during the 1984 seminar, and it appears that the steps taken are having some effect.

At this same meeting, the plan for the activities of the consumer cooperatives for this and next year was discussed. It establishes as the main task to be carried out activities designed to consolidate financial control, in order to

make this sector self-sufficient in terms of the funds which will guarantee its full operation, among the other activities mentioned.

One aspect which merited the special attention of the participants at the meeting had to do with the current prices for some farm products, in the light of the price liberalization decreed by the National Wage and Price Commission last year.

"The present prices of garden vegetables, for example, do not allow us to buy and resell any of the products in this category at prices the cooperative members can pay," one of the participants said. He went on to state that this problem is aggravated by the lack of transport facilities. He indicated a desire to see this question resolved, since if it is not, he stressed, the cooperatives may lapse again into the evil practice of selling only goods of first necessity, which are not always available on the market.

Speaking at the meeting, Faquir Bay thanked all the participants who, overcoming all obstacles, managed to travel very long distances to make the meeting a real success.

He added that meetings of this type are of the greatest importance, in his opinion, because they make it possible not only to discuss what has been done and to plan for the future, but also to have an exchange of experiences among the participants, "which may help us" in the execution of daily tasks.

He noted that for reasons which had not been explained, no representatives of the districts of Chicualacuala and Massingir were present, although they would benefit from all of the documentation resulting from the meeting.

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MOZAMBIQUE

#### BILENE DISTRICT ASSESSES YEAR'S SECTORAL GAINS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Feb 86 p 3

[Article by Bento Niquice: "A Time for Reflection in Various Areas"]

[Text] A number of meetings have been held recently in the district of Bilene-Macia, in Gaza, to assess the activities pursued in various sectors throughout last year. The meetings in question were organized and directed by party and government officials on the various levels. They concluded that, generally speaking, despite the difficulties facing the district throughout this last year, satisfactory progress was made in various sectors, particularly in the realm of combating hunger and the armed bandits.

Notable among these meetings was a lengthy session of the executive council of the district of Bilene held in Vila da Macia, with the local administrator, Eugenio Nhumai, presiding.

The meeting was devoted basically to an analysis of the main activities pursued in the various state sectors throughout last year. In addition to the council members, local executive council presidents participated.

A report presented at the meeting described the main activities pursued by some socioeconomic sectors in the course of 1985, with emphasis on the health and education sectors.

The report noted that, despite the shortages experienced on the domestic market where various medicines were concerned, greater attention was devoted to the establishment health stations, 18 in all, and the development of sanitary fills and latrines, in an unspecified number, among other projects.

In the field of education, greater concern was devoted to expanding the school network, with the addition of 68 new classrooms, using materials acquired locally by the people benefiting from the improvements. It was noted that the lack of teaching materials and other support equipment was a factor which contributed to the nonfulfillment of the programs drafted in this sector. This was reflected in a high student failure rate.

The meeting expressed satisfaction with the successes achieved in the economic sector in the fulfillment of the local programs to eliminate hunger.

"We guaranteed the allocation of larger crop areas to the peasant families and private farmers, whom we also provided with production tools and seeds. As a result of the complex of measures pursued, the people in the district increased their yields, harvesting large quantities of various products and selling the surplus along Highway 1 and the road from Macia to Chokwe," the report said at one point.

Further in connection with the elimination of hunger, the report said that a broad educational campaign on fruit and shade tree planting was carried out. As a result, the district achieved satisfactory indices in papaya production. The need to educate the people through discussion was noted.

In connection with the campaign against the armed bandits, tens of citizens swelled the ranks of the militia units and the special forces operating in this district, while hundreds of young people voluntarily enlisted, within the context of the Fatherland Appeal campaign.

#### Other Meetings

Meanwhile, the first secretary in the locality of Bilene presided several days ago at a restricted meeting for the rendering of accounts by representatives of the party secretariats on the base level.

The meeting, which was attended by representatives of the party cells with headquarters in Vila da Macia, concluded that, among other tasks, the party members devoted their efforts to the mobilization of the local people to participate in activities to combat hunger and the armed bandits.

On this occasion, a support commission was appointed to provide aid to the party cell at the Sao Vicente estaurant, which is having difficulties.

We have also received reports from Bilene to the effect that the people in the Mao Tse Tung Communal Settlement have indicated their desire to supply the Macia Health Center and the Motorized Infantry Battalion with reeds. The reeds would be used to improve and expand the installations of the two organizations in question.

The peasants indicated this desire during a meeting of the people led by the first secretary in the locality of Licilo, Alberto Maholoza Bila.

On that occasion, Alberto Bila reviewed the main activities pursued by the local structures throughout last year. He also discussed of the current farm season and the cashew harvest.

In conclusion, he praised the people for the effort made, which resulted in the construction of a maternity center, using local materials, thus resolving the problem of the great distances the women in that rural had had to travel in search of better health facilities for giving birth to their children.

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MOZAMBIQUE

SOFALA POPULATION STILL SUFFERING EFFECTS OF 5 YEARS OF DROUGHT

Lisbon AFRICA HOJE in Portuguese 8, Jan 86 pp 37, 38

[Text] In Mozambique's Sofala Province, large numbers of people are near death from hunger and the diseases associated with the shortage of food. According to figures published in the AFRICA EMERGENCY BULLETIN that were based on data from 15 October and information from the UN emergency operations office in Africa for 1 September, Mozambique continues to suffer climactic effects of the past 5 years of drought--cyclones and floods--all of which are aggravated by the continued civil strife.

In a speech given recently in Washington Dr Djidbril Diallo, head of information services for the UN emergency office said, in summarizing the effects of the drought in Africa, that in Mozambique alone nearly 100,000 people had died of hunger, which makes the drought the worst in the country's history.

The report by the UN emergency office says that hunger persists in some parts of the province of Gaza because the security situation makes food distribution difficult. A similar situation exists in parts of Zambezia, Quelimane, and Manica Provinces.

It is estimated that 1.8 million people, including 300,000 displaced persons, are affected by the food emergency situation. Meanwhile, another 2.3 million urban residents also need food assistance, especially cereals. According to the UN report, the Government of Mozambique has calculated that its cereals deficit for the period 1 July 1985 to 30 April will be 314,000 metric tons and says that the effects of the shortage will be felt most keenly in December and January.

Another factor hampering food distribution is that a substantial portion of the truck fleet needs repair; fuel shortages also occur. The lack of security has meant that part of the distribution must be made by sea or air. As of 1 September, the UNDP had airlifted 700 tons of food to Vilanculos, Chimoio, Beira, Tete, Nampula, Quelimane, Lichinga, and Pemba--all places that serve as distribution links to neighboring areas. An additional \$190,000 is needed to complete the airlift, and that is to be provided by a U.S. organization and by UNICEF. The UNDP has also brought in tractors and attachments for them and has ordered Land Rovers and spare parts from Great Britain and Zimbabwe.

UNICEF's financial support of the boat that is distributing food along the coast is due to expire at the end of November or middle of December, but the UN Food Program has already agreed to pick up the tab until an alternative is found. It is hoped, however, that by the end of 1985 The Netherlands will offer four barges to enable the distribution of food along the coast to continue. The report also says that the situation at the ports of Maputo and Beira needs improvement.

In its chapter on health, the report states that in Central and Southern Mozambique children, especially, are undernourished and there is an urgent need for supplementary feeding programs.

Guerrilla actions have continued to hamper food programs; the Red Cross has had to cancel most of its Health Services flights and the "Medicos sem Fronteiras" [Doctors Who Know No Boundaries] have also had to suspend some of their activities.

UNICEF began a vaccination program in Inhambane Province but also--according to the report for 1 September--expected that a cholera epidemic might break out in Beira due to the shortage of drinking water and the problems with city sanitation services. In fact, several provinces need wells and reservoirs.

There is a great shortage of seeds and farm tools, which will have a negative effect on this year's food production. Other products in short supply include pesticides, fertilizers, animal feeds, veterinary medicines, and domestic animals--all of which would cost about \$8 million.

Despite support from the international community, there is still a shortage of spare parts for agricultural machinery. The government's efforts to overcome these problems are hampered by the shortage of foreign exchange.

Discussing the promises of assistance and the contributions already made or yet to be given, the report credits Portugal with providing \$11,800 for flood aid, \$10,200 for technical support, \$38,600 for farm implements, \$17,800 for the Ministry of Industry and Energy, \$85,500 for insulation materials, and \$1,550 for calculators and accessories.

The report also mentions assistance from Sweden, CARE, UNICEF, and the Knights of Malta and states that negotiations are underway in the UN emergency office for \$2 million in logistical support and water supply aid.

The latest report in the AFRICA EMERGENCY BULLETIN states that despite the regular arrival of shipments of cereals under the UN's World Food Program, nearly 30 percent of the rural population continues to suffer from "moderate undernourishment," a condition that is worse in the areas where security is a problem.

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MOZAMBIQUE

#### DONATION OF VETERINARY SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTED IN SOFALA

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Feb 86 p 3

[Text] The second and final phase in the distribution of materials and medicines for veterinary use was recently completed in the districts of Machanga, Buzi, Nhamatanda and Dondo, in the province of Sofala. These veterinary supplies were a part of a donation made to our country by the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

According to Pinto Ribeiro, the technician in charge of the Veterinary Department of the Provincial Agricultural Office, the distribution of surgical equipment and medicines, in particular bistouries, antibiotics, disinfectants and tick dips, was effected through the family, cooperative and private sectors, as well as through some of the state enterprises supporting them.

This type of support, our source said, will to some extent guarantee a substantial improvement in the technical and medical aid provided to the livestock sector in the districts involved. They are, incidentally, the largest producers of livestock, particularly cattle, in the province.

This will also help the breeders to increase their veterinary knowledge. To this end, the department will make some technical cadres available for the popularization of veterinary techniques among the breeders.

There is no doubt that with the materials distributed, it will be possible not only to improve conditions for the raising of cattle, but also to promote an increase in this activity, according to Pinto Ribeiro.

Both the surgical equipment and the medicines reached Sofala in two lots, the first arriving early last year. The Provincial Swine Enterprise was in charge of distribution.

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MOZAMBIQUE

**PRIVATE WHOLESALER REPORTS RECORD CASHEW SALES**

**Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Feb 86 p 3**

**[Article by Bento Niquice]**

**[Text]** Xai-Xai--more than 500 tons of cashews have already been sold in the district of Xai-Xai, in the province of Gaza, since last November (beginning of the season), in a program headed by the Pinto Ferreira Warehouse, a local wholesaler. This volume, which is the record for the past 10 years, comes to more than double the goal initially set for that wholesale trade establishment, according to information provided to our reporters by one of the managing partners, Sarad Ratilal. However, several merchants participating in this campaign were unanimous in stating that there was inadequate transport equipment for the shipping of the product sold, and quantitative and qualitative shortcomings in the products in greatest demand, among other problems.

According to Sarad Ratilal, 550 tons of cashews have been sold to date, including 350 already delivered to the MOCITA, a processing firm. This delivery was made in December, almost 2 months after the beginning of the campaign.

He said that the goal for cashew sales in the district of Xai-Xai for the present harvest is 500 tons. Of this total, 200 are to be sold by the AGRICOM enterprise, and the balance by the private and cooperative trade sectors.

According to Sarad Ratilal, another 350 tons of cashews currently awaiting shipment in various trade premises should be delivered to the MOCITA by 15 February.

Making an overall assessment of the results this season, our interlocutor said that "in my view, this is the best season in the past 10 years." He said this is seen in the fact that the people are flocking to the trade premises and the merchants are occasionally forced to violate the trade schedule officially established by law.

## Support Products

Concerning the products distributed exclusively in support of this campaign, this private source expressed regret at the fact that the majority of the products are unattractive in terms of quantity and quality.

He explained that although there are products which could be termed highly desirable, they have not been seen, or when they have, the quantities have always been much too small to satisfy the needs in each zone of the district where trade takes place.

He mentioned goods of first necessity, such as oil and various types of cloth, as the main products eagerly sought by the producers or harvesters of cashews, whereas trinkets have not appealed to the people very much. "The fact is that this province has traditionally had a large number of immigrants to the South African mines, who on their return, bring trinkets with them. Therefore, few individuals are interested in this type of merchandise," Sarad Ratilal explained.

With regard to certain products requested by the cashew suppliers but unavailable at the time of the weighing operation, our interlocutor said that a system of vouchers has been adopted. As he explained it, these vouchers give the bearers the right to the product in question whenever it becomes available.

"This is a local experiment. But that is not all. The cashews purchased in this fashion are set aside, to facilitate their return, but only if by the end of the season the product wanted by the supplier is still unavailable," he stressed.

He expressed the hope that during the coming seasons, the mechanism for allocating quotas of support products will be reviewed, along with the quality of these products. However, the other products which are currently involved, such as batteries, sardines, candy bars and harmonicas, among other things, which are generally bought by children, who always carry cashews in their pockets, should not be overlooked, he said.

Another local experiment reported by Sarad Ratilal is the introduction of bread into the marketing circuits. As a result, the Chongoene Bakery and the Maciene Pastry Shop have managed to buy more than 7 tons of cashews. Bread is traded for cashews at the current prices for bread and a kilogram of cashews, with this quantity being equivalent to five loaves of bread. The only obstacle encountered is the shortage of wheat being received by these two establishments, because in addition to this, bread must be produced for the normal supply of the population.

## Integrated Cashew Program

Meanwhile, the district of Xai-Xai is now beginning to enjoy the fruits of the Integrated Cashew Program, based on the new foreign exchange system. According to this program, the sectors producing foreign exchange can reinvest a part of it, on the basis of the profit earned.

In this sector, the district has to date received replacement parts for the repair of vehicles owned by merchants who are participating in the cashew marketing programs. The replacement items received have included tires, inner tubes, and batteries, among other things.

It is important to note that this type of support was reported some days ago by the national director of the cashew enterprises, Fernando Gamito, during a visit he recently paid to the province of Gaza.

On the other hand, this marketing campaign, which will end in the first week of March on the Xai-Xai district level, involves 113 merchants, who have signed contracts for a total of 1,132 tons.

It should be noted that Xai-Xai is second on the list of leading cashew producing districts in this province. Manjacaze is in first place, and Chibuto and Bilene in third and fourth, respectively.

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MOZAMBIQUE

#### AIRLINE COMPLAINS OF FREIGHT TERMINAL OVERLOAD

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Feb 86 p 8

[Article by Jorge Costa]

[Text] The warehouse at the LAM [Mozambique Airlines] freight terminal in Maputo is completely full, and this situation has led the company to refuse now to accept more freight for shipment. If it is true, on the one hand, that the LAM has not always found the best solutions for moving the cargo it does accept, anyone visiting that warehouse, on the other hand, will see that it is not easy to manage such a complex and varied quantity of goods, much less when the packaging is fragile, inappropriate or nonexistent.

The key question is why there are no alternatives, or few, for transporting cargo, all of which goes by air today, from one point in the country to another, with the result that things are stored in the freight terminal because this offers an economical, safe and practical solution for many people.

Thus individuals who succeeded in obtaining documents ~~and~~ in their freight "priority" some months ago, respond, when asked to collect their orders now: "I have not yet had time. I will have to see to this."

We first became aware of this when a captioned photograph was published about a month ago, showing a sofa sitting on the grass outside the freight terminal at the Maputo International Airport. The very day it appeared, an official at the national transportation enterprise telephoned us and invited us to visit these premises to see what was happening.

We went. On entering the warehouse at the LAM freight terminal, one gets a shock. The most incredible and varied products are scattered everywhere, blocking all the free spaces. There are items of furniture, wooden boards, mattresses (the majority of them almost worn out and rotten), electric freezers, complete engines and even shells, dried fish, peanuts, beans, and sugar.

We had had the idea previous to that time that air freight is costly and is only used in extremely urgent cases, and that the value of the goods shipped must generously exceed this additional expense.

But this idea was dispelled there, since many of the things we saw (would you believe that there were even a dozen or so empty gas cans?) are not even worth the cost of transportation from the establishment from which they came to the airport. The LAM management sees this situation and explains it.

"The thing is that the value of things today is not always just material. We can understand that someone who is moving from his home in Lichinga would ship what he owns by the only practical means, which is air freight. In any case, it must be realized that the cost of our transportation, which is legal, official and includes a profit, comes to less than the subsequent rental of a wagon to carry the goods from the airport to the city," an official in the commercial department of the enterprise said.

#### Cheaper to Pay Storage

This shipping convenience is such that even in the cities which have ports, few customers ship their goods by sea, continuing instead to prefer air freight.

"It is a fact that we could make more flights with our cargo planes to relieve the congestion in the freight terminals in the various provincial capitals. But the flights are expensive for us, because they involve a natural expenditure of imported fuel, which we need for the normally scheduled flights," this same LAM official said. He went on to add: "We can make extra flights and we already have. But a few days later the situation is the same again, because demands to accept the widest variety of freight begin to flood in again."

Pedro Comissario da Silva, who is in charge of the freight terminal in Maputo, told us of various cases in his experience of individuals who even asked to pay to leave their goods in storage at the terminal because this is cheap.

There are many cases in which goods reach a city, but their owner has not as yet arrived or has not found a home. Thus they are set aside and time passes. At best, the owner appears to pay for the storage.

We were told that a civil aviation official personally made calls to various numbers listed as belonging to the owners of freight. Those at the other end of the line answered that they knew their goods arrived, but had not collected them because "the transportation cost is high," or because "I still don't have anywhere to put the things. I'd like to leave my things there a while longer, if that's all right."

#### Abandoned Goods Auctioned

We then made a similar experiment on the basis of a report provided by the freight terminal on individuals who had been asked for more than 3 months to claim the goods they shipped.

We rang the first number and asked to speak to John Doe. He answered. We asked if he had no interest in retrieving his goods. His answer was: "You

know, I still have not found time to go there. In any case, I don't have time today and won't tomorrow either. Maybe in about a week ..."

We made two more calls and asked the same question in each case. The immediate answer was: "I'll take care of it."

It was clear that all of these individuals had already been notified of the arrival of their goods, to the extent that they did not even ask the most obvious question: where was I calling from?

Pedro Comissario da Silva further explained to us that "our regulations say that after 70 hours, storage fees begin to be charged on the freight, and after 3 weeks, it can be regarded as abandoned and sold at auction or simply thrown out. We have not done this, because we understand some of the difficulties people have. But the situation here is in fact alarming."

In our view, the proper step would in fact be to implement the regulations, because, among other things, the present situation is leading to other problems, such as the carelessness and apathy now characteristic of those who work at the terminal. The proof is that the first time we were there, we pointed out a certain disarray and considerable filth scattered about the warehouse. Just yesterday, a little more than a week later, the premises were clean, and a new order and organization were visible, except for the freight which it was better to leave alone, to avoid further damage, because it was so old or lacked packaging.

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MOZAMBIQUE

#### CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PROMOTES CADRE TRAINING IN LISBON

Lisbon AFRICA HOJE in Portuguese No 8, Jan 86 pp 38, 39

[Text] The year 1986 will mark the start of a project for vocational training of Mozambican cadres, says Paulo Sande, president of the Portugal-Mozambique Chamber of Commerce, speaking in Lisbon.

Speaking at the opening session of the seminar sponsored by the Chamber, Mr Sande said that the training of Mozambican cadres is a task of fundamental importance that cannot be accomplished by sleight of hand but must be carried out systematically.

The seminar, the topic of which was "Outlook for the Development of Economic Relations with the People's Republic of Mozambique," was sponsored by the Portugal-Mozambique Chamber of Commerce and attended by 90 companies. There were two specific panel discussions. The first, moderated by Pessoa e Costa and Antonio de Vasconcelos Porto, discussed the implications of Portugal's membership in the European Economic Community for relations with Mozambique.

The second panel, led by Antonio Silva and Luis Ribeiro Pessoa, dealt in depth with areas of bilateral interest in trade and services and debated the specific problems of relations with Mozambique, especially the value-added tax, professional services tax, industrial tax, and other matters.

Paulo Sande, who led the presentation of the conclusions of the two panels, pointed out that the conclusions reached by the second panel would be the basis for recommendations to the government that certain technical points which hamper the normal operation of bilateral commercial exchange be revoked or restricted. He also announced that "the process of formalizing" the opening of a branch office of the Chamber in Mozambique and another in northern Portugal "is in the final stages." He pointed out that the Chamber's plan of action for 1986 includes a "meeting of entrepreneurs" to be held in that African nation.

On the issue of lines of credit, Mr. Sande gave his opinion that such measures "can no longer be seen as ways for decisively achieving the intended objectives." As an alternative, he said, it is urgent to "decide on new

sources of financing" and it is up to the companies participating in this meeting to "determine which direction to take in order best to serve their interests."

Admiral Souto Cruz, representing the president of Portugal, presided over the opening session, which was also attended by Honorio dos Reis, charge d'affaires of the Embassy of Mozambique in Lisbon, representing the ambassador.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

INHAMBANE: CONSEQUENCES OF FAMINE--It was reported in Maputo that 35 percent of the population of the Mozambican province of Inhambane suffers from malnutrition and lack of clothing because of the continued famine and war that have ravaged that region since 1981. The figures available indicate that approximately 1100 orphans are living in preschools and communal villages because their parents either died of starvation or were killed in the war. Inhambane, with a population calculated at nearly 1 million, is located along the coast of Mozambique between the Limpopo and Save rivers and is one of the provinces most affected by the drought which swept the country between 1981 and 1983. That same region was the scene, until a few months ago, of intensified Renamo activities--attacks on communal villages, residential and shopping areas, health services and trading centres, and boycotts of the transportation network. Mozambican individuals and international charitable organization have concentrated most of their attention on rebuilding elements of the infrastructure that were either damaged by the war or were rendered ineffective during the prolonged drought--the worst in 50 years. [Text] [Lisbon AFRICA HOJE in Portuguese No 8, Jan 86 p 39] 12830/13104

BEIRA-MACHIPANDA ROUTE REOPENED--Traffic is flowing again on the road between Beira and Machipanda as a result of the drop in the level of the Pungo-é River. The road reopened last Saturday. Moreover, the river waters are continuing to drop. Last Tuesday, the water level was at 6.75 meters, as compared to 7.39 meters on the 5th of this month. The rise in the waters of the Pungo-é River led to the loss of production along the banks, mainly corn and sweet potatoes. Forty families had to be evacuated. Despite these facts, the situation was not regarded as alarming, district administrative bodies said. The people who lost their crops have criticized the lack of or weak support provided by the local offices of the Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities and the Red Cross of Mozambique. In two localities in the district of Dondo, the people have been given seeds for the next farm season. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Feb 86 p 1] 5157

FOREIGN SHIPS DOCK--The Panamanian vessel Lady Dona is expected to arrive from Europe at the port of Maputo this morning, our reporters learned from a source in the port maritime offices in the country's capital. This vessel, that source said, will unload miscellaneous cargo, including crates of vehicles for our country, in the. On the other hand, the Soviet vessel Tseis, carrying miscellaneous cargo, is scheduled to leave our port this morning, the port authority source said. No arrivals or departures of vessels to or from the port of Maputo were reported yesterday. [Text] [Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Feb 86 p 2] 5157

SOUTH AFRICA

FOREIGN, DOMESTIC PRESS REACTION TO BOTHA SPEECH NOTED

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 3 Feb 86 p 7

[Article: "Much Support for Botha's Courage: London Newspapers Nonetheless Sceptical"]

[Text] Various foreign and domestic newspapers reacted over the weekend to the speech delivered in Parliament last week by the state president, Mr P. W. Botha.

Reaction varied from overwhelming support for President Botha's courage in turning towards "a new political direction" and strong admonitions that insinuations about the state president's reforms should now come to an end, to scepticism by some London newspapers about the latest offer of the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela.

In Umtata, President Kaiser Matanzima of Transkei said that he is confident that all of South Africa will pay attention to the implications of President Botha's speech. "I would like to congratulate the state president on his courageous and persevering attitude in the decision by his government and I want to convey my greatest congratulations to him and his government for what they have done to normalize relations in this country."

From London, our office reports that President Botha's speech received only a lukewarm reception in the British press. Some of Fleet Street's newspapers even ignored it.

However, the conservative London DAILY TELEGRAPH said in its editorial that President Botha has produced little for his government's legislative program this year.

It was conceded, however, that the revision of influx control measures, the expansion of property rights for Blacks and the involvement of Black communities in decision-making will be genuine steps away from classic apartheid.

## Right Denied

In its editorial, the liberal GUARDIAN sees President Botha's Mandela offer as a bit of "Afrikaner humor." The "Rubicon II" speech is dismissed as the oppression of protest and selective reform without the Black majority having been consulted.

"It is the Black majority that is still denied the right to freely choose people to speak for them. And all this is happening in the midst of a state of emergency," the article says.

From Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast, comes the report that that country's official daily newspaper, FRATERNITE-MATIN, reported over the weekend that it feels that it is too bad that President Botha has not moved on to the total dismantling of apartheid.

In a front page editorial under the headline "Another Attempt," the newspaper says that the much-anticipated speech contained "no effective action," "only intentions."

Even so, the newspaper encourages President Botha to "meet with his Black fellow countrymen, repeal offensive apartheid laws and grant Black men and women, your brothers and sisters, their full rights."

"And you will see that you will regain your place in the African and world community," the newspaper added.

In South Africa, the largest English-language Sunday newspaper, the SUNDAY TIMES, conveyed in a front page editorial yesterday its congratulations to the state president on his courage in "embarking on a new road."

The newspaper wrote under the headline "Yes, This IS a New Course":

"When a National Party leader declares that apartheid is outdated and buys double-page advertising space in newspapers to announce that he has taken the first step towards institutionalized power-sharing, only the blind or the willfully perverse will persist in claiming nothing has changed in this country."

## Test

"On Friday an era ended in South Africa, a miserable, hurtful era...President Botha tossed almost four decades of ideological folly out of the window."

In the same editorial, the newspaper encourages the "builders--in Ulandi or elsewhere" to participate in the proposed national statutory council in order to test President Botha's commitment to genuine reform.

"This council, and participation in it, is as much a test of the proclaimed moderation of certain Black leaders as it is of Mr Botha's sincerity. Wise men will make use of it (the council)."

In his column "Kortom," the editor of RAPPORT, Dr Willem de Klerk, wrote yesterday:

"No one can misunderstand President P. W. Botha. His opening speech in Parliament said everything that must be said now and can be said now. The petulance and malice with which some people look suspiciously at his reform speeches must now come to an end."

In its editorial yesterday, the SUNDAY STAR not only criticized the "Mandela trick" by the state president, but also expressed its reservations about the government's plans for this year's session of Parliament.

The newspaper feels that the government's plan for the 1986 session is too weak for the forces that it faces.

"The direction is correct--towards greater reform--but there are serious doubts concerning whether it (the plan) contains enough persuasive power to regain the initiative that is gradually beginning to slip from the government's hands.

"Perhaps the government can win parliamentary votes against weak opposition parties, but the battle is raging more outside Parliament than inside it," the SUNDAY STAR writes.

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SOUTH AFRICA

FOCUS OF PARLIAMENTARY NO-CONFIDENCE DEBATE DISCUSSED

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 3 Feb 86 p 1

[Text] The dramatic political initiative by the state president, Mr P. W. Botha, to create a new South Africa of equal opportunities, equal treatment and justice for all, will be the focus of the traditional no-confidence debates which begin this afternoon in all three houses of Parliament.

The greatest amount of interest will be directed towards the debate in the House of Assembly, where the most important political parties will take directly opposite positions. Because the dividing lines have been drawn more clearly than ever since President Botha's speech on Friday, particularly lively and even heated confrontations are envisaged.

It is expected that President Botha, several senior ministers and leading figures of all the parties will take part in the debate. Further details of the government's initiatives and plans could come to light.

Besides policy on race relations, about which the National Party can expect sharp attacks from both the Left and the Right, there are several other issues about which sparks could fly.

These include the disturbances and the police's handling of them; the policy of violence of the African National Congress; difficult economic issues such as the rising rate of inflation; South Africa's relations with neighboring countries; and the internal division within the Progressive Federal Party on aspects of national security.

Course

But it is expected that the debate will be mainly dominated by the positions expressed Friday by President Botha in the directive reform speech with which he opened the session of Parliament. There can no longer be any doubt about the government's course after the speech and the elucidatory advertisements that appeared yesterday in the most important Sunday newspapers.

In the advertisements, which were signed by President Botha himself, he says bluntly that the government is committed to power-sharing; that the planned national statutory council is the first step towards permanent power-sharing;

that influx control is being abolished; that the passbook system for Blacks will be abolished before 1 July; and that he envisages more reforms (See also reports on p 2 and 7).

#### Sour

These aspects, together with his statement that South Africa has outgrown the outdated concept of apartheid, will be examined closely. It can be assumed that the two far-rightist parties in the House of Assembly will be especially vehement in their opposition to these policy guidelines.

The sour reaction that came on Friday from the Progressive leader, Dr Van Zyl Slabbert, to President Botha's speech was an indication that the PFP realizes that it is largely being left behind in the raging debate on the future of the country. It will apparently try to give more relevance to its role as official opposition by trying to seize the initiative on other issues.

It has already announced that one of its most important weapons will be the disturbances and the government's handling of them. The minister of law and order, Mr Louis le Grange, and the actions of the security forces will be important targets. It will also focus on the rising cost of living and other economic problems.

The PFP will also have to defend itself against accusations surrounding its negotiations with and position on the ANC, which is turning increasingly to violence. Tensions between the leftist-radical power clique and the moderates in the party could be driven to the surface.

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SOUTH AFRICA

NP OFFICIALS PREDICT BLACKS IN CABINET IN NEAR FUTURE

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 22 Jan 86 p 1

[Article: "Rencken Lets Cat out of Bag -- Blacks in Cabinet Soon"]

[Text] Blacks may be admitted into the cabinet as early as the next parliamentary session. This emerges from statements which the chief information official of the NP, Mr Chris Rencken, who is also MP for Benoni, made to the newspaper of a well-known hotel group. Mr Rencken told the paper in October of last year: "You cannot try to manipulate the news media ... we believe that the country's international image will change when there are two or three black cabinet ministers." To the question as to when that would probably happen, Mr Rencken replied: "In the next parliamentary session if I get my way."

Great significance is attached in political circles to this pronouncement by Mr Rencken because he is the NP's chief information official. He could hardly make these statements in a personal capacity. By using the word "we", Mr Rencken is obviously referring to the NP. His statement about Blacks in the cabinet is therefore in all probability in accord with the government's official position on this.

Powersharing

This is confirmed by a personal interview which Peter Taylor of the London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH recently conducted with the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Pik Botha. Mr Botha is quoted as follows: "At gatherings they ask me: 'are Blacks going to sit along with you in the government someday?' -- and the answer is 'yes'. That is the clearest testimony that we are sincere." In the same interview Mr Botha said that it is very unfair to accuse the government of something (racial discrimination) in which it does not believe itself. "We accept powersharing. The only thing which has to be worked out is how and with whom. We accept it in principle from local government up to the highest level of government." Mr Botha categorically declared later in the interview: "White domination will disappear."

## Prediction

The government has for a considerable time already been preparing the domestic climate as well as the outside world for the admission of Blacks into the cabinet. When he opened parliament on 25 January last year, the state president, Mr P.W. Botha, opened the door to such a step in a cautious way. He said that structures for Blacks are going to be created outside the national states [tr note: i.e. "homelands"] in which they can decide on their own affairs up to the highest level. There will then be liaison with these bodies on matters of common interest. The minister of education and development aid, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, went further in September when he told a newspaper that the white electorate is ready to give Blacks a share in political decisionmaking at all levels, including the highest level. The "highest level" can have only one meaning: the cabinet.

DIE AFRIKANER revealed in September of last year that a prominent member of the NP, and MP for Randburg, Mr Wynand Malan, held out the prospect of a multiracial coalition government and a black president of state. He made that prediction to a Canadian newspaper, THE TORONTO STAR. Mr Malan later told a Johannesburg Sunday paper there should not only be talk of a black president for South Africa in theoretical terms -- it should be made possible in practice.

## Concessions

Assurances about ending White domination were also given by Mr P.W. Botha in a letter to 14 Western heads of government. That letter also referred to powersharing with all groups and the acceptance of the principle of full participation in the government by all "communities." The government accepts a united South Africa, common citizenship for Whites, Blacks, Coloreds and Indians and a system of common franchise, the letter stated.

The expectation is that the political future of Blacks is going to dominate this year's parliamentary session. Announcements about this may already be made when Mr Botha opens parliament on 31 January. Western governments are now exerting strong pressure on the government to make further far-reaching concessions. Mr Botha's speech is already being called "Rubicon Two" by the foreign press. Mr Rencken's statements to the hotel paper indicate that the government regards the admission of Blacks into the cabinet as the only means to improve South Africa's image abroad.

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SOUTH AFRICA

CP, HNP EXCHANGE SHARP CRITICISM

CP Paper Attacks HNP

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 15 Jan 86 pp 8,9

[Unattributed article: "Virulent Attack by CP Paper on the HNP"]

[Text - Preface] A particularly sharp attack is made on the HNP in the latest edition of the CP [Conservative Party] paper in connection with pamphlets which the HNP disseminated last year in the Vryburg by-election. The following article responds to this.

[Main Text] Three sharp attacks on the HNP are published in DIE PATRIOT of December 1985. It is apparent from these that, in spite of CP claims that it is not fighting against the HNP, the CP is now quite openly conducting its battle against the HNP. It is certainly true that it can be good to openly discuss differences between the two parties. But then the first requirement is that the truth must be adhered to. If the truth is not respected in such a talk, it can only be because the side which is guilty of that either does not have good arguments or is filled with ill feelings toward the other. And then such a talk can have dangerous consequences. In any case it is a misdeed against the public interest not to deal with facts correctly -- especially at a time like this when there is such an excess of deception and falsification in politics.

One of the articles in DIE PATRIOT bears the title "HNP's lie propaganda in Vryburg." It has to do with a pamphlet which the HNP disseminated in Vryburg. It is rather striking that this very pamphlet stated that "if it is proven that any facts in the pamphlet are false or not the truth, the HNP will apologize in public." This challenge was not at all taken up by the CP in the by-election in Vryburg. Now, long after the election, some CP figure or other sees the chance to label them lies without the slightest proof for that claim from him. What is especially shocking is that the article in DIE PATRIOT, with two exceptions, does not quote what is in the pamphlet, but gives a mere arbitrary reproduction of statements in the pamphlet, and that key facts in the pamphlet are just ignored. Thus, for example, the pamphlet quotes from an interview of Dr Treurnicht with the paper LEADERSHIP from the first half of 1984. "The facts are", Dr Treurnicht said, "that I agree with certain policies and principles of the National Party."

That is suppressed in the report of DIE PATRIOT. On the basis of this statement by Dr Treurnicht, the HNP wrote in the pamphlet: "Every policy of the National Party proceeds from the principle of racial equality in the name of moving away from discrimination. Dr Treurnicht endorsed that principle while he was in the National Party under Mr Vorster for nine years and under Mr P.W. Botha for four years. Which policy and principle of the National Party that Dr Treurnicht supported in 1984 has not since 1969 led progressively to the dismantling of apartheid and the promotion of racial integration?"

This part must be read along with the HNP's companion pamphlet which was also disseminated in Vryburg and which, *inter alia*, states: "After the establishment of the HNP in 1969, the Conservative Party leaders gave support to Mr Vorster for nine years and for four years supported Mr P.W. Botha's policy direction of moving away from discrimination, of equalization of wages, abolition of work reservation, multiracial trade unions, multiracial club sports, multiracial Springbok teams, multiracial Craven Week competitions, multiracial theaters, multiracial restaurants and hotels, multiracial universities, a multiracial presidential council and a multiracial defense force."

"Dr Treurnicht, as leader of the NP, said in an interview with the first 1984 edition of the paper LEADERSHIP: 'After the HNP moved away, I was satisfied with Mr Vorster's leadership, although he had a certain pragmatic approach which was not exactly mine. But in general I was satisfied with his leadership in politics.' There was thus no matter of principle or policy over which Dr Treurnicht differed with Mr Vorster. Dr Treurnicht says further in that interview: 'The fact is that I agree with certain policies and principles of the National Party.' What these policies and principles are with which Dr Treurnicht agrees is not clear, but it is logical to assume that they include everything that the NP announced and did under Mr Vorster and Mr P.W. Botha until February of 1982 when CP leaders broke away from the NP."

"Even in March 1979 Dr Treurnicht wrote in the NP paper, NAT-BRIEF; 'The National Party is our precious political abode. We do not have an alternative. Its principles are the guidelines of our practical policy... The application of the policy must be accelerated... We continuously give our support to our chief leader (Mr P.W. Botha). We say to him: go forth, we are with you and we pray for you.' Thus up to March of 1979 Dr Treurnicht identified wholeheartedly with everything of the National Party, and in March of 1981 he described Mr P.W. Botha as an eagle who was rising."

"At the latest congress of the CP Dr Treurnicht said he refuses 'to condemn' Mr Vorster. That necessarily means that he stands by all of Mr Vorster's activities. Without attacking or reproaching Dr Treurnicht, it must be stated that if Dr Treurnicht stands by Mr Vorster and his policy, he cannot stand far from Mr P.W. Botha, especially when at the start of 1984 he told the paper LEADERSHIP that he agrees with certain policies and principles of the NP. Mr Botha is just continuing Mr Vorster's policy of moving away from discrimination more quickly. But everything that the government is doing now was already built into its policy when it started multiracial sports and

permitted the outside world to push its pattern of multiracial sports onto South Africa."

No attempt is made in the article in DIE PATRIOT to contest the genuineness of this quotation, to deny the facts or to assail the statements. The CP's response to this is: "Dr Treurnicht was then supposed to have endorsed the principle of racial equality for nine years under Mr Vorster and four years under Mr Botha. That's a lie! Was separate development of powersharing and development toward self-determination not the policy of the NP? It still says so clearly in the 1981 manifesto of the NP!", says the CP writer. It is preposterous that the NP policy of 1981 is characterized as "separate development!" Such rubbish is offered to claim that the HNP was supposedly spreading lies. If any CP man would believe that the NP policy up to 1981 was separate development, he never knew what the policy of separate development was.

The next point which the writer of the report in DIE PATRIOT deals with are the 1977 constitutional proposals. The HNP pamphlet states: "The National Party had then already accepted the 1977 constitutional proposals according to which South Africa would be governed by a Council of Cabinets consisting of seven Whites, four Coloreds and three Indians. As leader of the National Party, Mr Vorster declared in the Volksraad: 'The Council of Cabinets will perform the same function that the Cabinet performs at present.' That was thus unmistakably the acceptance of the principle of powersharing with Coloreds and Indians. Dr C.J. Jooste, director of Sabra, also expressly termed that powersharing." (DIE TRANSVALER, 13 September 1979).

For the sake of completeness it should be added that Mr Vorster stated in the same debate in the Volksraad on 12 April 1978: "The Council of Cabinets will function in the same way that our cabinet functions at present, and if the current cabinet is an executive cabinet, then the Council of Cabinets will also be executive by nature." After this explanation, Mr Hennie Smit, as the minister responsible, stated in RAPPORT of 11 June 1978: "Within the state departments for common affairs there will be no ceiling for people of other colors. A Colored can become a secretary of a department and even a minister." That was the official position of the National Party which was endorsed by the CP MP's from April 1978 to February 1982. How else could they have remained in the party?

The 1977 constitutional proposals were published in Government Gazette 6 386 of 3 April 1979 as the National Party's official constitutional plan. In it the Council of Cabinets is designated as the "Executive Authority"; and when Mr Alwyn Schlebusch, as the minister responsible, explained those proposals to the Representative Colored Council, he wrote: "After the transition phase there will eventually be nothing to prevent a Colored or Indian from becoming a minister of a common portfolio." (DIE TRANSVALER, 10 March 1979). Dr Treurnicht and his colleagues knew that and nevertheless they remained in the National Party.

Powersharing is not something which first reared its head in February of 1982 when the CP MP's raised objections on the basis of that word. OGGENDBLAD's front-page headline on 20 August 1974 read: "White and Colored will share

power like this -- Vorster." On 25 May 1977 OGGENDBLAD's front-page headline read: "Colored, White will govern together -- Koornhof." On 24 November, Mr Louis Le Grange, stated as a minister: "The Council of Cabinets will involve joint decisionmaking on joint affairs." (BEELD, 25 November 1978). And all the time the CP MP's went along with the National Party of Mr Vorster and P.W. Botha.

The HNP pamphlet asks: "Does Mr Beyers acknowledge that in 1977 he and Dr Treurnicht accepted the principle of powersharing with Coloreds and Indians? Did he and Dr Treurnicht accept it out of conviction or out of expediency? If they accepted it out of conviction, do they still stand by the constitutional proposals of 1977? If not, do they reject it now because they realize that their political judgment and conduct was wrong at that time?"

The response of the writer of the article in DIE PATRIOT to this is: "Mr Vorster is quoted where he said: 'The Council of Cabinets will perform the same function that the Cabinet performs at present.' Everyone knows that's a controversial pronouncement. The NP likes to use it. Also the HNP. It looks like multiracial government. Mr Vorster repeatedly gave the correct interpretation. Why does one still persist in keeping it quiet for one's own benefit?"

Mr Vorster's statement is called "a controversial pronouncement." That is not the point. What is relevant is what Mr Vorster's words mean. That is not touched upon. Instead, what Mr Vorster said when he was already out of politics and had turned against Mr P.W. Botha out of personal considerations is quoted (without date). That reads as follows: "'There was no question of a mixed cabinet as the Presidential Council recommended'. And further: 'I don't care about Curry's and Hendrickse's party -- if they won -- sending a Colored to THEIR parliament and about THEM being ministers for Coloreds. It's the Coloreds' choice and it's their business, but I refuse to accept Hendrickse as a minister over me and my children!'"

This position of Mr Vorster as a private person is no "interpretation" of the position that he took in the Volksraad as NP leader and prime minister. It is a mere about-face to give his opposition to Mr P.W. Botha the appearance of principles. His stand in the Volksraad quoted above is crystal-clear and not at all subject to different interpretations, but especially not reconcilable with the utterance referred to above in DIE PATRIOT. As a matter of fact, that utterance by Mr Vorster when he did not hold any political position is not at all relevant, and to drag it in is not to go along with truth and honesty.

The next point which the writer of the article in DIE PATRIOT deals with is the sports policy. The HNP's pamphlet on this read as follows: "Dr. Treurnicht agreed in 1969 with the HNP that racially mixed sports would change the whole pattern of society in South Africa and would undermine the policy of separate development. He wrote, inter alia, in HOOFSTAD of 19 September 1968: 'We do not permit the pursuit of sports between White and non-White in South Africa.' About six months later (25 April 1969) Dr Treurnicht wrote: 'We accept that against the background of our policy of non-mixed sports and with the necessary circumspection, New Zealand is not going to entertain us with

Maoris.' He thus clearly said that he stood by 'our policy of non-mixed sports.' What Dr Treurnicht wrote in the subsequent sentence is especially very significant. 'I thus find', he wrote, 'still no reason in the sports question to break away from the National Party.' With that Dr Treurnicht morally committed himself in public to breaking away from the National Party if Maoris were included in an all-Black team. But when Maoris a year later were indeed included in an all-Black team, then Dr Treurnicht remained in the National Party! What then became of his moral enterprise? When Dr Treurnicht was years later questioned by a young lady student at a public gathering, his reply was: 'I say as Pilate says: what I wrote I wrote -- so what' (BEELD, 2 October 1979). (The translation of 'so what' is 'what of it?")

"The deduction from this is that when Dr Treurnicht has committed himself in public to a principle and he rejects or disavows that principle later, and he is then called to account, his response is: 'what of it?' or 'what does that matter to you?' Is that how Mr Beyers wants Dr Treurnicht to get rid of his moral obligations in public life? That a principle was involved in this case of sports is clear from what Dr Verwoerd said just six months before he was assassinated: 'It is therefore clear that the principle which we are dealing with here [is applicable] with respect to all forms of social intercourse, including entertainment and sports...' Is Mr Beyers satisfied with a leader who acts this way with a principle? Does Mr Beyers acknowledge that he and Dr Treurnicht were wrong to remain in the National Party while sports were used to undermine and destroy the foundations of separate development?"

The CP writer's response to this in DIE PATRIOT is: "The HNP refers to Dr Treurnicht's position on sports. Quotations are given. A lady student referred to these quotations at a public gathering. Dr Treurnicht's reply was: 'I say as Pilate says: what I wrote I wrote. So what? What else can that mean than: I stand by what I wrote. And what of it? To connect Dr Treurnicht to multiracial sports is one of the most frivolous attempts of the HNP. It's a wanton suppression of his clash in the caucus against mixed teams. The HNP is beholden to the truth to get its facts right and correct them."

This response is such an obvious attempt to muddle the issue that it scarcely needs to be mentioned. Dr Treurnicht's "clash in the caucus against mixed teams" every time resulted in an abandonment of his position and acquiescence in the NP's policy of increasingly racially mixed sports, or else he could not have remained in the NP. It is indeed a characteristic of certain CP MP's that they took certain stands for the sake of their voters, but then silently followed the opposite direction.

The CP writer's reasoning is distinctively clumsy about Dr Treurnicht's remark "I say as Pilate... so what?" To claim that Dr Treurnicht meant by that "I stand by what I wrote -- and what of it?" is to do Dr Treurnicht a disfavor, for that would mean that Dr Treurnicht stood by his opposition to racially mixed sports while as an NP member and office holder he was obliged to support the NP policy of racially mixed sports! That can only suppose a complete lack of a moral foundation.

The next point which the CP writer broaches is the HNP pamphlet's reference to a statement by ex-minister Ben Schoeman. "Dr Treurnicht's pronouncements and change of principles led to Mr Ben Schoeman, former minister and leader of the NP of the Transvaal, saying: 'Dr Treurnicht has an elastic conscience.' (DIE VADERLAND, 7 November 1979). That was when Mr Schoeman and Dr Treurnicht were still both members of the National Party. Is it for Mr Beyers a qualification for leadership if a person 'has an elastic conscience' in the eyes of his fellow members?"

The CP writer's response to this is: "Minister Ben Schoeman is quoted about Dr Treurnicht's conscience. But Mr Schoeman was in fact present at the caucus when Dr Treurnicht stood up and expressed his opposition to multiracial sports. It's his conscience which is elastic, for he remained seated in the Cabinet after Dr Verwoerd's Loskopdam speech and also after Mr Vorster had announced that the Colored Representatives would disappear from the Volksraad. We thus say to the NP: Don't be ridiculous."

The CP man's comment on this is of course not relevant. The attack he makes on Mr Ben Schoeman because the latter stayed in the NP after Dr Verwoerd's Loskopdam speech is equally applicable to Mr John Vorster, who remained in the NP along with Mr Schoeman while they tacitly did not agree with Dr Verwoerd and -- according to the CP writer -- had "elastic consciences." But this has nothing to do with Mr Schoeman's remarks that Dr Treurnicht has an elastic conscience. And this is how the CP writer in question "exposes HNP lies!"

Another matter which is dealt with in DIE PATRIOT is a quote from a book by an English writer, about which the HNP pamphlet reads as follows: "Dr Treurnicht got mention in a book by an Englishman, R.W. Johnson, 'How Long Will South Africa Survive?' which was published in 1977. In it Johnson writes: 'If one is looking for a white politician who is flexible enough to push through majority rule and is to the right enough to retain conservative confidence while doing it, then Andries Treurnicht is likely the man.' That is how this enemy of Afrikanerdom regarded and sketched Dr Treurnicht. Is this how an Afrikaner leader should look in the eyes of our enemies?"

The CP writer's response to this is: "One R.W. Johnson is quoted from 1977 about how flexible Dr Treurnicht would be 'in pushing through majority rule...' How foolish! It is now the HNP's authority. Just because it wants to smear Dr Treurnicht, an unknown Englishman is quoted as the HNP's truth." Any child can realize with how much dishonesty the CP writer has proceeded here. The HNP does not accept Johnson as an authority. What it asks is: "Is this how an Afrikaner leader should look in the eyes of our (note: our) enemies?" This is the question which the CP writer should answer, but which is circumvented with an accusation that the HNP "quotes the Englishman as the truth." Actually, when a discussion has fallen to such a low point of evasiveness and dishonesty, it is difficult to respond meaningfully.

That the CP writer in question has a sort of obsession in connection with the HNP is further corroborated by the attack which is lastly made in the article on Mr Jaap Marais: "Mr Jaap Marais did not resign from the NP. He wanted to

stay in. But he and his colleagues were kicked out. His conscience permitted him to still want to stay within the NP and fight for his viewpoint there. They have to kick us out, it was said."

The CP writer must have been almost blind with prejudice when he wrote that little piece, for he entirely overlooked the obvious gaps in his reasoning. The remark "he and his colleagues were kicked out" must raise the question: why? And the answer is obvious: because they were not willing to stretch their consciences. They were kicked out because they refused to abandon the NP principles and to fall in behind a policy of "change." The NP leaders (Messrs Vorster and Schoeman) did not want Mr Marais and company to stay in the NP on the basis of the NP principles. Mr Marais and company refused to resign because that would then give the impression that they had abandoned the NP principles. By the expulsion, the NP leaders were obliged to acknowledge by implication that the NP principles had been kicked out and therefore those who stood by them had to be kicked out too. It is evidently too difficult for the CP writer to comprehend that Mr Marais and company's position was that they had the fullest right to remain in the NP because they maintained the NP principles, and that it was the others who had no right to stay in the NP, because they had abandoned the NP principles.

This then is the CP writer's allegation under the headline "HNP's lie propaganda in Vryburg" -- an allegation which is concluded with the remark: "And so one HNP lie after the other can be exposed!" One should take note of two things. If that is the quality of the CP's exposure, it cannot be any effective opposition to the NP. The other is that the tone and style of that article, and especially the last remark above, is very reminiscent of the days when the CP MP's were still in the NP and the standard technique of the NP [was] to shamelessly run down HNP politics as lies, while they knew that the HNP stood for the truth, as the history of our time has repeatedly proven.

Perhaps the CP writer in question will realize in due course that the HNP has never yet needed to resort to lies and deception. It today enjoys respect even among opponents because it was loyal to the truth -- that is where all loyalty begins.

#### Marais Answers HNP Attack

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 22 Jan 86 pp 8,9

[Unattributed article: "Jaap Marais Answers CP Attackers"]

[Text - Preface] The television interview which Dr Wimpie De Klerk had last year with the leader of the HNP, Mr Jaap Marais, had an unexpected aftermath in December. In a sharply worded article, the CP's organ, DIE PATRIOT, attacked Mr Marais' reference in the interview to the fact that the CP MP's remained in the NP when the HNP was already fighting against the NP. Mr Marais is responding to this attack himself in the accompanying article.

[Main Text] A vehement attack is made on the HNP in the December issue of the CP paper, DIE PATRIOT, in connection with what was said about HNP-CP relations in a talk televised on 17 November 1985 between Dr Willem De Klerk and myself.

The relevant portion of the talk went as follows: "We made reasonable progress until the recent elections. We have now clashed with each other in Vryburg, and that has upset the relations. But there is a great level of collectivity between us. There are also differences which I do not think are unbridgeable. There is of course the historical factor that those men remained in the NP for a long time while we were fighting against the NP, which is perhaps the most important single factor coming between us. I think it will take some time yet for the parties to grow together. I do not believe in a merger. That is an artificial thing. By a furtherance of joint actions where we undertake things together, mutual association and confidence grow and there can be a coalescence which is meaningful."

That these remarks of mine could give any offense is surprising, for it was a very ordinary matter-of-fact statement which was meant precisely not to stir up feelings. After the TV broadcast numerous prominent members and office holders of the CP congratulated me by telephone, telegram and letter. No one felt the least uneasy about anything said in the broadcast. As a matter of fact, those who referred to that portion did so approvingly. This makes the handling of the matter in DIE PATRIOT all the more remarkable and puzzling.

The piece in DIE PATRIOT begins with a reference to the statement in connection with the historical factor quoted above, but it is not quoted in DIE PATRIOT so that the readers will know exactly what it is about. Instead, the introduction to the article reads: "The 'historical' reason is that MP's from the CP then remained in the NP for such a long time." And then the same paragraph continues, as if I had said it in the TV broadcast: "They then probably agreed with everything which Messrs Vorster and P.W. Botha said and did." (I had expressly avoided saying anything of that nature). Any reasonable person will realize that this addition was obviously meant to give the impression that in the TV broadcast an attack was made on MP's from the CP so that it could be used as a justification for a counterattack on the HNP. The impression is inevitable that a reason was sought in the TV broadcast to attack the HNP, and when there was not a sufficient reason, a simulated reason was fabricated.

It is relevant what the position of MP's in the NP caucus of 1969 to 1982 was, for the NP fought against the HNP in that period, and of course the current MP's were for 13 years from inside the NP directly in struggle with the HNP over almost every political issue. It is this self-evident truth which I mentioned in the most unemotional and uncontroversial terms in the talk with Dr De Klerk.

If the CP spokesman who wrote the piece in DIR PATRIOT differs with that, one would have expected him to objectively argue against it. But that is not done at all. Evidently the basic consideration is that any reference to that 13-year period is not allowed, and the mere mention of it is regarded by certain CP MP's as an attack on them which must then be answered with a counterattack. The counterattack is aimed directly at me in the article with the announcement: "Mr Marais ought really to take note of a few other historical facts too." What can reasonably be expected is that those "other historical facts" would be used to refute what I said. But that is not done in the least. Instead, a sort of charge sheet is drawn up against me on a whole

variety of claims. Each one of these claims should be looked at. In summary, they are in sequence:

- I supported Mr Vorster's election as leader and remained in the NP for three years under his leadership.
- CP MP's were not interested in membership in the HNP, for "Mr Marais' leadership was and is unacceptable";
- "The HNP's style of acrid personal attacks was and is unacceptable";
- "The HNP's policy on English as an official language was and is unacceptable";
- "The HNP's policy on homelands and their independence was and is unacceptable";
- "Mr Marais's refusal to have the possibilities of unification of the HNP and CP investigated";
- "Mr Marais' hatred of Mr Vorster is also historic."

Only Mr Vorster's election as leader and Mr Marais' so-called hatred for Mr Vorster will be treated here. The others will be left for later.

**My relationship with Mr Vorster:** It is generally known that over the course of quite a few years there was a good personal relationship between Mr Vorster and me. A number of times when he was not able to address a public or other gathering which he was obliged to do, he asked me to go in his place. He consulted me about literature on communism and even on more personal matters too. After proceedings of mine in the caucus, on more than one occasion he congratulated me and assured me of his support for my position. A good deal more facts of this nature can be mentioned.

When Dr Verwoerd was assassinated, Mr Vorster was a strong claimant to the NP leadership, but (and this is a big BUT) that was only on the basis of his record of "rightist" pronouncements and conduct, such as, for example, his critical motion in the caucus on columns in DIE BURGER, his financial contribution to THE SA OBSERVER, his financial contribution to the Adriaan Pont Defense Fund, his sharp pronouncements on liberalism, his refusal -- as minister of justice -- to attend a social get-together of legal practitioners at which Indians would be present, his action against communists in his capacity as minister of justice, and so forth. It stands to reason that if Mr Vorster had not had this record, he would not have come under consideration for the leadership of the NP. Mine and others' support of him was based on that, and we certainly had the right to expect that Mr Vorster would maintain this rightist stand.

It is true that I, along with Messrs Fanie Botha, Gaffie Maree and Jan De Wet, asked Mr Vorster to run for the leadership of the NP. For the record, it should be mentioned that Mr Vorster said that he was a junior in the Cabinet and that his election as leader could split the NP. My only contribution to the whole talk was that the party would not split because of that -- Dr Verwoerd was, for example, also a junior in the Cabinet when he became leader. I added as a truism that a party splits when it deviates from its principles -- words which later turned out to be rather prophetic.

In the shocked condition of the nation on account of the horrible assassination of Dr Verwoerd and the difficult circumstances under which Mr

Vorster had taken over, I believed that he should get all support on the basis of his enterprise during his election; namely: "My path will be the path of Hendrik Verwoerd." Instead of taking up his time with a visit, I wrote a note of encouragement to him; I did not even keep a copy of it. To my surprise, some years later after he had gone off the track of Hendrik Verwoerd and had forced a split upon the NP, Mr Verwoerd gave the note to the press for publication. On the one hand it is surely a question of personal taste and judgment whether one (and especially a prime minister) does something like that. On the other hand it is politically critical to drag in support which has been promised a person on certain principles when that person (in this case Mr Vorster) abandoned and disavowed those principles. If it were I who had deviated from the principles and Mr Vorster who had stood by them, it would have been completely appropriate to use the letter as testimony against me, but it was the other way around, and that makes the whole difference. Mr Vorster's use of it in the particular circumstances creates the impression that he was anxious to try to score a point against me and thus did not spare the inappropriate use of such a letter, even when it would reflect poorly on him as prime minister.

One of the NP's paid organizers at a public gathering in Vryburg had a copy of the letter, which he wanted to use against me during question time. I invited him to give the copy to me so that I could read it aloud to the gathering over the microphone and everyone in the audience could listen to the complete text. He concurred, and I read the letter in its entirety out loud and commented on it. After that I never got any question or inquiry about that letter again. If the CP writer considers that affair of importance, as is evidently the case, he is welcome to publish the contents of the letter so that everyone can read what is in it.

Without my having been aware of it at the time, Mr Vorster interpreted that letter to others like I was supposed to have offered myself for promotion with it! This misunderstanding of Mr Vorster's came up indirectly about two years later when he evidently wanted to test me about the possibility of promotion. In a talk in his parliamentary office about the dispute in the NP at the time, he said to me: "You know how little talent there is in the place. We cannot afford to lose your talent." My response to that was that we knew each other well enough and had to keep personal qualities out of the talk so that we would not make the confused relations even more complicated. I could see by Mr Vorster's reaction that my response had upset his anticipation.

Joined with these claims of the CP writer about my relationship with Mr Vorster, he makes the "charge" that I sat in Mr Vorster's caucus for three years -- evidently to suggest that there thus could not be any difference between me and CP MP's who sat for nine years in Mr Vorster's caucus and for four years in Mr P.W. Botha's caucus. Apart from the length of time (which is obviously of essential importance), there is another big difference: it is that Dr Hertzog, Mr Willie Marais, Mr Louis Stofberg and I were not willing to compromise on the principle of separate development. After much contriving, Mr Vorster and his people realized that they would not be able to persuade us to swerve to the left along with the NP. That is why we were kicked out. That is the precise fact. Without making any reproaches, it must be put down as just a precise fact that those MP's who went along with the NP policy after

1969 of course made compromises on principles, beginning with sports, and thence to the multiracial Presidential Council and Council of Cabinets according to the constitutional proposals of 1977 and 1979. That is the difference between those who left the NP in 1969 and those who left in 1982. This simple fact cannot and must not be talked or wished away, for it is an important part of contemporary history. The best thing is for this fact to be faced with the least emotion. My position as a rule was that the HNP and CP should undertake joint campaigns and in this way create a growing history of collectivity in which there would be a further move away from the Vorster-Botha era and through which that period would become of less and less topical interest. That is the only meaningful approach. Why the CP leaders do not want to do that and make proposals for an instant merger, is not only incomprehensible, but also completely unrealistic.

Around the Vorster syndrome there is still the above-quoted statement by the CP writer: "Mr Marais' hatred of Mr Vorster is also historic." (Note that the CP writer is dealing with the TV broadcast of Dr De Klerk's and my talk, in which the name of Mr Vorster was never mentioned.) It is a fact that a leader of a political party is associated with the policy direction which the party follows, and of course he attracts attacks from opponents. In the early years of the National Party, General Hertzog was presented and attacked in the most hateful terms by the English press; just as also Dr Malan, Att'y Strijdom, Dr Verwoerd, Dr Eric Louw and later also Dr Albert Hertzog. In the same way from the other side, General Louis Botha was called "a political milksop" by General Hertzog in the Volksraad, and according to the female writer MER [sic], General Hertzog said of General Smuts that he was "without principles." During and after the Second World War General Smuts, as prime minister, was attacked in earnest by the National Party, as was also his deputy, Minister Jan Hofmeyer. And when Att'y J.G.N. Strauss became leader of the UP [United Party], he was mercilessly attacked and derided by the National Party and its press. What is laid to my charge as "hatred of Mr Vorster" is the normal conduct of a political opponent against a government leader. If my behavior is characterized as "hate", all the former Afrikaner leaders of note will have to get the label, and that is obviously nonsensical. My accusation against Mr Vorster was based on principles. And history since 1969 has proven that the HNP's accusations against Mr Vorster were fundamentally completely right and justified.

At that time the leftist propagandists of the NP set the tone in that party, and they came to Mr Vorster's protection with the accusation that the HNP's criticism amounted to personal attacks on Mr Vorster. The truth was that those propagandists had to divert the discussion from the NP's deviation from principles in order to camouflage the NP's and Mr Vorster's move to the left. The HNP's exposure of the NP's betrayal of principles was regarded as a deadly threat. Therefore an unprecedented hate campaign was conducted against the HNP. HNP leaders were slandered and besmirched; HNP gatherings were harassed and disrupted by the coarsest hooliganism under the command of NP MP's; political police were used against the HNP by order of Mr Vorster; legal actions were brought against HNP leaders in order to cast suspicion on them; and laws were passed to thwart the HNP. This was one chorus of hatred by the NP leaders against the HNP. This has evidently slipped past the CP writers [sic], or perhaps he was a party to this chorus of hatred.

I do not want to apologize at all for my conduct and remarks against Mr Vorster. Whenever I attacked him, he was the personification of the degeneration of the National Party. I saw with shock how Mr Vorster gave false assurances about policy matters, made false accusations against persons, secretly plotted against caucus members and made use of false pretenses to do things. I gradually had less and less respect for his political insight and judgment and more and more questioned his susceptibility to liberal bodies. I saw with surprise how he was influenced to change his "image" to a nice golf-playing fellow, which earned him the nickname of "Jolly John" at the Rand Club.

My biggest accusation against Mr Vorster, however, is his reckless rending and weakening of the National Party which he inherited from Att'y Strijdom and Dr Verwoerd. That is the primary cause of the crisis into which the white people of South Africa have been plunged. Through Mr Vorster's conduct, the liberalists have been placed in control of the party to undermine the policy of separate development, and through "change" and "reform" alter the NP's whole nature and foundation of principles to an anti-national and anti-apartheid party. I regard this deed of Mr Vorster's as an unpardonable transgression against the vital interests of our people.

Next, my charge against him is that he missed the greatest historical opportunity to forge Afrikaners and English into a solid national unit by inexorably standing on the side of the English of Rhodesia against the enemies from the English-speaking world of Britain and the USA. If he had done that, South Africa would today have been a fortress of white society, and a feeling of being bound together in destiny would have pervaded Afrikaner and Englishman. Instead, Mr Vorster transformed this historical opportunity into an act of Afrikaner disloyalty toward English people and an incalculable renunciation of the white society of southern Africa and especially South Africa. His sellout of the Whites of Rhodesia was an unmistakable sign that the Vorster government had rejected the Verwoerd policy and joined the side of Rhodesia's enemies. There could be no greater breakthrough for the terrorists than that. Because of that, the greatest enemy of South Africa's white society, Robert Mugabe, came in place of the friendly Ian Smith. That is the result of a shocking disloyalty, not only against the Whites of Rhodesia, but also against South Africa as a whole.

This conduct is rooted in Mr Vorster's detente policy, which was nothing other than the American policy for southern Africa. The essence of that policy was, as Mr Vorster put it in October 1974 in the Senate at the time: "The price of additional conflict will be high -- in my opinion to high to pay." Thereupon the South African Police were withdrawn from Rhodesia as the sign to the terrorists that South Africa had turned its back on the Whites of Rhodesia. The rashness of the pronouncement and policy was that South Africa has given to understand that it no longer wants to fight against the enemy. But the enemy has not thought of stopping or diminishing the fighting. They later forcibly gained ground in southern Africa, and South Africa's position has proportionately been drastically weakened. As for foreign policy, Mr Vorster practically made South Africa a colony of America and laid the foundation for the current high-handed interference from leftist American

bodies. Other things which Mr Vorster spoiled to the great detriment of South Africa, such as sports policy, his striving for equalization of wages -- for which inflation was harnessed -- and the recognition of Blacks as permanent in the white area, I will leave at that, for, however important, I do not put them altogether on a level with the other things discussed above.

The 1977 constitutional proposals are the one other things which was a glowing accusation of a serious nature against Mr Vorster's policy. However one may play with words like "power division" and "powersharing", it cannot be doubted that the proposed Council of Cabinets of seven Whites, four Coloreds and three Indians was accepted by Mr Vorster as powersharing. He termed the Council "an executive cabinet" twice in the most explicit terms in the same Volksraad discussion on 12 April 1978. The disguising of that as "power division" was a terrible transgression against the good faith of less informed people. It was an unpardonable dishonesty to play with words about such an important matter as a country's constitution. It was a planned deception to move the white people to diminishment of political power and removal of race and color as a distinguishing factor from the constitutional order. With the 1977 constitutional proposals for powersharing by Whites, Coloreds and Indians, Mr Vorster opened the door to the present dangerous constitutional order.

If CP figures say that I had "hate for Mr Vorster", it is qualified in the limited sense that Mr Vorster represented a policy direction which to me was the pinnacle of political folly and at the same time the extreme irresponsibility toward the vital interests of our people. My good personal relations with Mr Vorster were disturbed by deep differences of principles which came between him and me and gradually developed into a gap as he moved further left. The question is not in any case whether I hated Mr Vorster and whether he hated me. The question is: was Mr Vorster right? Was he right when he abandoned the policy of the National Party, ruined the National Party's unity, raised the liberalists like a Piet Cillie, Schalk Pienaar and Wimpie De Klerk to authorities on what separate development and nationalism are? Was he right when he permitted foreign inreference in South Africa's foreign policy by, for example, letting Dr Hastings Banda of Malawi come to South Africa with the express goal "of killing apartheid through friendship?" Was he right in shifting the NP's focus of enmity from left to right and joining in the leftist propaganda that the danger from the right is just as great as the danger from the left. Was he right when he directed the National Party toward a political war against American nationalists for the sake of racially mixed sports.

No matter how strongly Mr P.W. Botha's actions are criticized, it must be acknowledged that he is only continuing on the foundations which Mr Vorster laid. Not a single aspect of current NP policy has any principle other than what Mr Vorster chose. Mr Louis Nel's recent statement that the NP has dissociated itself from the past is the logical conclusion of the Vorster policy. Lord Salisbury said "it is through the assessment of results that one arrives with confidence at a just judgment." The results of Vorster politics are visibly such a calamity for our people and our country that there is no need to argue about it. The CP writer of DIE PATRIOT should rather free himself from the obsession of finding fault with the HNP and look soberly at what the results of Mr Vorster's leadership were. Then the distance between the HNP and CP will also become smaller. If not, the CP will elevate the Vorster era to a permanent barricade between the HNP and CP.

SOUTH AFRICA

GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE INCREASES DRAMATICALLY IN 1985

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 15 Jan 86 p 1

[Article: "Serious Overcollection -- Government Rolling in Tax Money"]

[Text] While the general public is getting poorer -- among other things as a result of the heavy tax burden -- the state's revenue from income tax and general sales tax increased dramatically last year. Information recently published by the treasury shows that income tax over the period 1 April - 31 October 1985 amounted to about R9.147 billion. That is 38 percent more than in the comparable period in 1984. During the same period the state revenue from general sales tax was about R4.6 billion, which exceeds the figure for 1984 by 42.6 percent.

Income tax includes all tax on the revenues and profits of persons, mining and other companies. According to the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is not possible to break down the income tax on a monthly basis according to source. In 1984/85 about 56 percent of all income tax came from persons and the rest from companies. In the light of the weak economic situation and the consequent decline in company profits, it is a reasonable assumption that the income tax obtained from persons provided for the largest part of the sharp increase. In view of the fact that Whites pay about 90 percent of all personal income taxes, they are affected the worst by this overcollection by the state.

According to the budget presented to the Volksraad in March of 1985, the state expects about R15.5 billion from income tax from all sources during 1985/86. The experience during the first seven months of the fiscal year indicates that this figure will be far exceeded and will eventually amount to very close to R18 billion. That is about 15 percent more than the budget figure, or about two months' taxes.

Economists who were approached for comment agree that the state of affairs leaves a lot of scope to effect substantial tax relief in the next budget. They point out that the tendency toward excess in the tax revenues has been continuing for years without compensatory concessions being made to the taxpayers in the following years. Thus about R12 billion in income tax was initially estimated for 1984/85, while the actual collections amounted to nearly R13. Besides the extra allowance which hopefully is due on 1 April

1986, the government can easily grant a further reduction of eight percent. In so doing, the position of especially the middle-income group should be improved drastically and relief granted not just to the highest income groups.

In view of the situation, civil servants agree that their service ought to get a generous increase. Civil servants last received a general raise of 12 percent on 1 January 1984. Since then their bonus has been cut by a third, while inflation will by 31 March 1986 erode the value of their salaries by 40 percent as compared with January 1984. The fact that the state's real tax revenue in 1985/86 will exceed the budget figure by more than two billion rands brings a general raise of 20 percent into the bounds of achievable reality. Such a raise would cost the government about two billion rands.

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SOUTH AFRICA

GOVERNMENT AD CAMPAIGN, EXPANSION ABROAD DISCUSSED

Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 3 Feb 86 p 7

[Article: "Excellent Reaction to Government's Marketing Campaign"]

[Text] Reaction to the unique and aggressive advertising campaign by the state president, Mr P. W. Botha, is so favorable that the campaign may soon be extended to other countries in order to improve the government's communication with the outside world.

Yesterday a unique advertising campaign was kicked off in Sunday newspapers in which President Botha himself explains the government's latest reform initiatives in a concise and bold announcement.

This campaign is the first of its kind in South Africa with the sole purpose of giving the state president's public relations a considerable and badly needed push.

Depending on local success, the marketing campaign may be soon begun in the United States and Europe as well.

In the statement by President Botha--which was signed by him--he confirms his commitment to power-sharing and reform.

It will be run in the Afrikaans and the English-language press, but will not be broadcast on television. SABC does not permit advertisements of a political nature.

The campaign was undertaken and designed by the Johannesburg advertising agency Grey Holdings in consultation with the KMP Compton agency.

They were informed of the campaign last November by Mr Louis Nel of the new Department of Information and Mr Pik Botha's Department of Foreign Affairs.

The final product was approved by the state president only Friday morning.

Mr Nel said yesterday that beginning today, the campaign is being continued nationwide in nearly all daily newspapers. The state president's message will

also be conveyed in the weeks ahead through pamphlets and other means of communication.

With respect to publicity abroad, Mr Nel said that handling it is in the hands of the Department of Foreign Affairs. However, the government hopes that the local campaign will in the meantime elicit so much positive reaction in South Africa that it will spill over to foreign countries.

Mr Darryl Phillips, chairman of the Gray group, said that the very positive feedback that he got yesterday from the business sector in particular should be quite fruitful.

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SOUTH AFRICA

FREQUENT NEWS ON ANC VIEWED AS LEFTIST INFILTRATION OF MEDIA

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 22 Jan 86 p 4

[Article: "The NP and the ANC"]

[Text] It is striking how South African newspapers have been giving great prominence lately to the African National Congress. One Sunday paper had in its latest edition the main report on an ANC measure and on pages two and three a banner headline stretching over both pages in connection with the funeral of a (white) ANC member in Lesotho. That is indeed an extreme expression of preselection on the basis of political partisanship, but it is not outside the general pattern.

There is obviously coordination between key persons in the media and a network which promotes ANC tactics by influencing, for example, business people, church people and students to conduct or try to conduct talks with the ANC. Such campaigns are good propaganda material for the ANC, and by giving publicity in the media are extremely favorable to the ANC. The impression has in this way been aroused in recent weeks that the ANC has practically assumed the political initiative in South Africa. The sustained agitation for the release of Mandela and the high newsworthiness which the media gives his wife's comings and goings of course fall into the same pattern. The publicity toward the last-mentioned person in particular is so saliently selective with a view to propaganda that any person with power of discernment can notice it.

When the continual publicity given to the Nico Smiths, Beyers Naude, Desmond Tutu and Alan Boesaks is added to these phenomena, nobody has to ask why it is done -- the media is infiltrated by persons dedicated to promoting the leftist, revolutionary policy of the ANC. The technique is simple: raise the ANC to the newsmaking factor and bend around it the satellites whose actions and statements fall into that vein. Mr Gerhard Ludi, who infiltrated the communist party in the 1960's, from there infiltrated the editorial staff of a large Johannesburg English afternoon paper. In the 1970's the political correspondent of a Johannesburg English morning paper (since then closed) was identified as a member of the communist party and sentenced to imprisonment. Other journalists got out of South Africa when things started to get too hot.

## Goal

Mr Ludi expressly stated recently in a talk before a student audience that the communist party regards infiltrating the media as an important goal. And because television is such an important means of communication, it is obvious that the television service in South Africa will also be infiltrated by the communists, he said. That is the context in which one must regard the ANC's current high profile as a communist front organization in the South African media. Without communist fellow-travelers and henchmen in the media, the ANC, Mandela and company and the leftist political preachers would not have had the newsworthiness which is now being given them. The Botha government evidently accepts this as normal and in this way allows the ANC's interests to be furthered, while that organization is banned in South Africa and Mr P.W. Botha has described its leaders as "disciples of the devil."

The root of the problem is that since the National Party began to fight against the right, it has become all the more unwary toward leftist subversion, and as the party under Mr Vorster's Mr Botha's leadership has moved further to the left, it has become all the more powerless to strike at the left out of fear that it could hit its own supporters and sympathizers. These conditions have made it all the more favorable for the communists to further their revolutionary goal, to foment discontent among Blacks, to make use of young Blacks for riots and violence and in this way undermine law and order and gradually make the country ungovernable.

It is incredible naivete that the South African government persists in the fiction that to win the war, "the hearts and minds" of the people must be won, conscripts must build ahtletic fields for Blacks and must appear as officers of peace instead of as the foremost combat line in a war against Russian imperialism and its mercenaries in the ANC. In Mozambique, the former Rhodesia and Angola the terrorists did not strive for satisfying the needs and eliminating the grievances of the peoples in question, but for power. That is the case with the ANC in South Africa.

The South African government is manifestly opposing the communist onslaught of the ANC more and more weakly, and the big reason is that the "National" Party has lost its ability to fight the left. The existence of a communist party in South Africa is therefore practically ignored and kept outside the field of vision. So the leftist forces are succeeding in creating a revolutionary situation in the name of continually accelerating "change" and "reform." Revolution is change and reform in high gear. South Africa cannot afford the Botha administration's political dissipatedness. We must work day and night to remove him from power in the next general election.

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SOUTH AFRICA

SEPARATE BLACK STATES CONSIDERED ECONOMIC, POLITICAL FAILURE

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 22 Jan 86 pp 10,11

[Article: "Territorial Separation Has Failed So Badly"]

[Text - preface] Dr. H.F. Verwoerd built his ~~homeland~~ policy on three pillars: the political growth of the black areas into viable states, administrative influx control and economic homeland development to neutralize the suction power of the cities. The constitutional program succeeded, but it became an empty shell because the policy of dynamic economic development was dropped. The economic policy did not fail, but was wrecked by leftists in the government after Dr Verwoerd. Influx control stopped black job seekers from flooding the white cities for many years. But the pressure is becoming greater, and this pillar of Dr Verwoerd's policy may also soon be demolished. In the meantime, the financial burden of the present government's ineffective development policy has become heavier than what the white taxpayer would be able to bear. This situation contains all the elements of an explosive financial, political and social crisis.

[Main Text] The latest report of the Decentralization Board demonstrates the complete bankruptcy of the government's development of the national states. About 40,000 job opportunity will allegedly be created in the current fiscal year with the very substantial subsidies which the state pays out of tax money to industries that are set up in the national states. This figure, however, is barely 15 percent of the number of job opportunities that must be provided annually in those states for the natural growth of the working population. There can be no question of a turnaround in the flow of black labor to the cities, which should be the actual initial political goal of the decentralization policy.

Only 17 percent of the industries which were attracted to the national states by the decentralization subsidies were actual transfers from the cities. Each job opportunity created now requires about R14,000 of capital investment, which indicates that a completely inapplicable, expensive and capital-intensive technology is being pursued. In 1970 the investment was about R350 per job opportunity. Instead of promoting an adapted, labor-intensive establishment of industry, the Decentralization Board encourages the transfer of sophisticated, highly capitalized techniques from the cities to the national states in order to create the impression that the decentralization

policy is succeeding. The market economy of the cities must apparently also be set up in the national states. However, much labor is exempt in that process to "export" the capitalist system to the national states and replace primitive traditional black agriculture -- the black subsistence economy -- by a modern market-oriented economy. On the one hand, new job opportunities are indeed created in industries, but on the other hand new unemployment arises from the disruption of the subsistence economy. The one policy cancels out the other without purposefully integrated community development which meets basic needs locally and keeps the black population on their feet. The government's decentralization attempt is thus negative for the Whites in terms of labor flow and of little use to the national states themselves in terms of real economic growth.

It is expected that the Decentralization Board's ineffectual practice will cost the white taxpayer R520 million this year. The Board's expenditures in 1984-85 were R338 million and in 1982-83 only R90 million. The white taxpayer is getting less and less value for his decentralization rand. Decentralization expenditures are part of the state's total outlay for developing the national states. According to official figures, this amount will come to R1.536 billion in 1985-86 for the independent states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda (R540 million in 1980-81) and R 1.641 billion for the self-governing states (only R478 million in 1980-81). Along with a planned R300 million which the state is investing this year in the Development Bank of Southern Africa, but without the investments of the Industrial Development Corporation, the government's ineffective development of the national states is going to cost the taxpayer R 3.477 billion this year, or almost 12 percent of the national budget. While this development work still signifies less for the Whites in terms of territorial separation, the costs of it for Whites has increased by more than 200 percent in five years. It now costs nearly R250 per month for every white family.

The idea behind the decentralization policy is recognized internationally, is practical and economically sound. Dr Verwoerd had already started to shift job opportunities for Blacks to the border areas with the aim of bringing about territorial separation. Job opportunities were later expanded to the national states themselves by the then minister of Bantu administration and development, Mr M.C. Botha.

A modern economy is inclined to develop strong centripetal forces which make more and more labor flow to the cities because of market forces. The mechanism by which the free market makes the urban metropolises grow and the rural areas regress was already described 40 years ago by the Swedish economist Gunter Myrdal. This principle can be traced back to the German economist Weber, who lived a hundred years ago. Governments have always recognized that the inherent inclination of a market economy toward overconcentration can and must be counteracted by government action. One of the ways to do that is the creation of industrial growth points which, after they have once been set up, can give rise to an independent growth momentum. By this means the spatial development flow can be gradually reversed.

Dr Verwoerd rightly assumed that if he could make it advantageous enough for industries to move to growth points in or near the national states, the

process of black urbanization in the white region could eventually be reversed. It turned out, however, that mere subsidies are not enough to reach that goal. Before a growth point can attain its own economic momentum with an acceptable multiplication effect, it needs a certain minimum development attempt. Growth is very slow until that level of investment, which represents a threshold value, is obtained. If the development spending is of such a nature that the above-mentioned threshold is not reached, it is a weak investment. It is like money thrown into a bottomless pit. Under these circumstances the subsidy carrot could not persuade enough owners of labor-intensive factories in the cities to move to a decentralized growth point. Thus a stick is needed besides the carrot. This is already found in Article 3 of the Law on Physical Planning, which is aimed at impeding the engagement of black labor in the white areas.

Sabra further proposed in 1974 that a selective wage tax should be instituted in the cities, which would place a levy on urban employers for every Black whom they engage. The funds would be used to enable the development corporations of the national states to create new job opportunities. Dr Hudson Ntsanwisi, chief minister of Gazankulu, supported the idea. He laid claim to an amount equivalent to 10 percent of the salary of every Shangaan working in the city -- without that worker's salary having to be diminished. This measure would have greatly freed the development policy from the contribution of the white taxpayer. It would also have provided the "stick" to make Dr. Verwoerd's policy succeed. Rand NP parliamentary members and Mr John Vorters' leftist economic adviser, Dr Piet Riekert, however, rejected the proposal, and Mr Vorster then also decided against it. The Decentralization Board had to then plod along with insufficient incentives and without any prospects of success.

The consequences of this lack of a dynamic policy soon became clear. Between 1970 and 1980, according to figures of the Development Bank, the average per capita growth in the national states was only 1.3 percent per annum. In 1970, 28 percent of South Africa's black workers were employed in the national states, but in 1980 -- 10 years later -- it was only a scanty 29 percent. By 1982, industrial decentralization provided only 6.8 percent of the manpower in the national states with job opportunities. Benso, Mr P.W. Botha's development think tank at that time, declared that the principle of homeland development had failed. The national states apparently had no development potential. It was recommended that in the future comprehensive districts, no longer national states, should be developed. The government immediately followed that advice. In reality, however, it was only the government's halfhearted, reluctant and incompetent application of decentralization which made this policy fail. The policy and principles are still undamaged; all the arguments in their favor have not yet been refuted.

For the Whites this new course meant that homeland development as an instrument for territorial separation has been watered down to mere regional development. For the national states themselves it actually just meant that they would become neglected areas within regional context instead of labor-stimulating border areas within the framework of the national economy. For Mr P.W. Botha this situation was beneficial to his integration policy, for it contained the principle of a single integrated South African economy.

After the adversity with the large regional project which the national state of KwanDebele was to develop along with Bronkhorstspruit and parts of the Eastern Rand, some development economists began to advocate that industrial decentralization should preferably be scaled down. They argued that a new approach, that of satisfying basic needs and integrated agricultural development in the national states, should get priority. The new emphasis on community-oriented development is indeed valid, experts say. This policy, which along with effective industrial decentralization, would make a well-rounded success of the initial policy, should be developed by the homeland merely for its own sake -- with tax money from the government, but no longer as a part of a nationwide policy which would be able to guarantee white self-determination.

Under the present circumstances there is no substitute for a dynamic growth point scheme for a net repatriation of urban Blacks. Without it, South Africa will have to permanently accept the millions of urban Blacks. In addition to this, a further three million Blacks will move to the cities within a few years as a result of the probable abrogation of influx control. This influx will bring about unprecedented social, economic and political problems. The concluding chapter of the government's new development policy is being written by the Development Bank, which in its annual report refers to the great poverty among urban Blacks -- those who apparently should be precisely a priority target of the economic development policy. The Development Bank endorses the objectives of the leftist Urban Foundation, the black chamber of commerce (Nafcoc), Assocom and the FCI.

With this policy Mr P.W. Botha has completed his 180-degree swing away from the policy of Dr Verwoerd. Dynamic development of the national states within the framework of racial separation is in the process of being continually watered down to the level of mere social uplifting work in Soweto and other black residential areas. In the meantime the white taxpayer must still pay the piper -- with the difference that he now has no guarantee for self-determination.

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SOUTH AFRICA

DIE VADERLAND ASKS IF BLACK BOYCOTT JUSTIFIABLE

Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 12 Dec 85 p 10

[Editorial: "The Price Is too High"]

[Text] A black boycott of white business enterprises has succeeded in the Eastern Cape. Now it is spreading to other parts, including the PWV [Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging] area. Before other judgments are pronounced on that form of protest, the question must be asked whether black protest as such can be justified. We believe a case can indeed be made for it. Without that sort of black pressure, reform would not have become such an urgency. And it can be said in favor of boycotts in general that at least they are not violent, not in themselves anyway.

The justification for black protest is, however, adulterated because the government is not only willing to negotiate, but is also creating the opportunities and instruments for that. The justification for protest diminishes to the extent that the militant leaders refuse to negotiate. The case for protest boycotts is further weakened by such a large portion of the black community supporting it under intimidation. That in turn leads to violence against Blacks themselves. That is apparent from all the boycott campaigns. People have even been gruesomely murdered for the sake of the store boycotts. While the boycott campaign is thus non-violent per se, it leads to violence which in turn develops into a circle.

White business enterprises are indeed fully placed under pressure, which is transferred to the government to give in to black demands. The final question, however, is whether the price that the black community is paying is worth the fruit it bears. We have already referred to the violence. Added to that is that black exploiters are making usurious profits from their own community need. Finally, white enterprises are not going under without already scarce work opportunities for Blacks also being destroyed in the process.

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SOUTH AFRICA

POLICE HANDLING OF WINNIE MANDELA CRITICIZED

Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 2 Jan 86 p 8

[Editorial: "Unfortunate Conduct"]

[Text] We have understanding for the difficult and thankless task of the police whenever they have to take action against radical protest leaders. People like Dr Allan Boesak and Mrs Winnie Mandela are in the local -- but especially the international -- spotlight. Anything that happens to them is news. And the most unfailing way to get publicity is to commit the sort of technical security law violations which lead to their arrest.

Brigadier Johan Coetzee of Soweto is probably right when he says that Mrs Mandela is seeking a "confrontation situation" with the police. She is also getting it. The very fact that the police are aware of Mrs Mandela's designs would lead one to expect that they would use good judgment by acting with the least fuss. The damage ought to be limited at least as much as possible in a no-win situation. That is why the manner in which they proceeded to arrest her Monday is so astounding. First the media, foreign included, was thoroughly apprized that something was going to happen by warning them to stay out of Soweto because Mrs Mandela was seeking a confrontation. Then, with sirens screaming, she was stopped and arrested on the freeway on the way from Jan Smuts airport. Of course Mrs Mandela and her entourage fully exploited the situation, including a policeman's attempt to grab her grandchild from her arms. And all this in the presence of a large retinue of local and foreign press men armed with microphones and cameras! Mrs Mandela wins hands down in the publicity and propaganda fight.

It is a political circumstance and perhaps it is expecting too much of our police to be able to handle something like that with the necessary finesse. Mrs Mandela will be the political winner every time she is arrested or appears in court. Isn't there anybody in our political hierarchy with the necessary strategical ability to outmaneuver her?

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CSO: 3401/22

SOUTH AFRICA

WHITES, BLACKS ARE SEEN AS TARGETS OF ANC TERRORISM

Pretoria DIE TRANSVALER in Afrikaans 18 Dec 85 p 16

[Commentary by Political Editorial Staff: "ANC Shows True Colors"]

[Text] The African National Congress is proving anew by its words and deeds that it is not interested in a political solution for South Africa, but in violence -- violence aimed at White as well as Black.

PRETORIA - The African National Congress's acknowledgment that it is responsible for the latest landmine acts of terrorism near Messina is entirely in keeping with the policy pronouncements of that organization. The ANC has also intensified its propaganda campaign since the riots in certain black residential areas in South Africa increased and dragged on earlier this year. The campaign boils down to instigations to violence at home while the terrorist attacks from outside the country's borders are being continued sporadically and in a cowardly manner -- because they mainly strike at civilians. The propaganda is mainly contained in texts of statements by the ANC broadcast in exile, which is regularly disseminated by the BBC in its summary of world broadcasts. While the ANC leaders are not permitted to be quoted in South Africa, it is general knowledge that the voices of unyielding radicals carry the tenor of the messages.

The latest disclosure about radicals who dominate the banned organization and who refuse to negotiate at all on a political solution for South Africa comes from Mr Herbert Beukes, the Republic's ambassador in America. He says the (radical) group supports violence and terrorism aimed at White and Black. They do not want negotiation and democracy. And that tallies completely with information that DIE TRANSVALER has received: that militants in the ANC have recently again stressed their enmity toward Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu and Inkatha. As a matter of fact, that black leader has been declared a co-archenemy along with the government of South Africa. It is also evident from ANC statements why Buthelezi must be fought -- it is because he renounces violence and has committed himself to peaceful negotiation.

There are few black leaders in southern Africa who have seen through the ANC so thoroughly and recognized it for what it really is as Chief Minister Buthelezi. What is more, the ANC is aware that Buthelezi's moderate voice enjoys support among millions of Blacks. The ANC knows only too well that

Buthelezi has become one of the biggest stumbling blocks in its path of violence as a means to get to the regime and try to overthrow it. That is also the principal reason why agents of the ANC have made Inkatha the targets of their domestic terrorism.

The latest alarming acts of terrorism which took the lives of innocent victims on the border with Zimbabwe can now for the time being finally remove any doubt which has still arisen as to whether the ANC may be interested in talks and negotiation. People who want to talk do not commit murder. It is surprising -- but ironically also not surprising -- that the outside world still sees the ANC as a "liberation organization" even after the weekend's gruesome incidents.

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SOUTH AFRICA

RAWU SECRETARY GENERAL DISCUSSES INDUSTRIAL UNREST

Amsterdam DE VOLSKRANT in Dutch 5 Dec 85 p 4

[Report on interview with Union Leader Donsie Khumalo by Janny Groen: "Black Unions Cannot Shun Politics"; "Pretoria Fears Primarily Industrial Unrest"]

[Text] Amsterdam--He was arrested on 13 September because of breaking the "intimidation law." A few days later he was released on bail (over 1000 guilders), but his freedom was put under restraint.

Officially he is not allowed to travel outside of the district of Pretoria, he can't leave his house in the black residential area of Mamelodi between 7:00 o'clock in the evening and 6:00 o'clock in the morning, he must report every day to the police station and he is not allowed to talk with the workers in the Harrop-Allin (finish hardware) factory where he works.

Yet Donsie Khumalo (30), secretary general of the Retail Allied Workers Union (RAWU) received an exit visa from the South African authorities. Last weekend he participated in Paris in a forum discussion on apartheid, together with the white clergyman Beyers Naude and the South African author Nadine Gordimer. This week he is in the Netherlands for consultation with unions on potential support to the new super trade union federation COSATU with which the RAWU (26,000 members) is affiliated.

"Possibly Pretoria hopes that I won't return, then that's an easy way of getting rid of a trouble maker," Khumalo says. "But perhaps they're also hoping that I will indulge in provoking statements abroad, so that on 13 December, when I have to appear in court, they can detain me on more serious grounds. Therefore, don't ask me any questions on economic sanction measures. A higher god, such as Bishop Tutu, can permit himself to make strong pronouncements on that, but lower gods such as myself risk lengthy penalties with regard to freedom."

Slippery Grounds

[Question] The new chairman of COSATU, Elijah Barays, definitely did not mince matters in Durban this past weekend. He posed an ultimatum to Pretoria with respect to abolition of the pass laws and openly appealed for the withdrawal of all foreign investments from South Africa. In doing that, doesn't COSATU put itself immediately on politically slippery ground?

Khumale: "Naturally, I would be the last person to deny that. But isn't any resistance risky in South Africa? Yet I think that a Barayi can permit himself more than other individuals. He represents a powerful union body, of over 1/2 million black workers. Surely Pretoria would think twice before openly attacking that.

[Question] The United Democratic Front (UDF), with which over 660 organizations are affiliated, has a much more impressive following numerically and enjoys broad international support. Nevertheless the entire UDF leadership is detained.

[Khumale] "The UDF, that is a very different matter. The UDF is a front of base organizations which have strong roots in the black community. Because of that broad basic structure, the UDF was able to organize campaigns in all sorts of areas and at various levels. District residents rebel against rent increases, and students boycott lessons. UDF trade unions, such as the RAWU, organize work stoppages or strikes to protest detentions or the presence of the army in black neighborhoods. The strength of the UDF is that it is able to coordinate all those various unrelated actions; the UDF lays the broad foundations.

The fact that such a strategy represents a serious threat to Pretoria has become very clear during the past year. Therefore the UDF leaders were picked up, one by one. They hoped--in vain--to paralyze the organization by eliminating the top leadership."

"The trade unions," Khumalo emphasizes, "are in an entirely different situation. To eliminate trade union leaders is more delicate, for they manipulate a powerful weapon: millions of black laborers, who keep the South African machinery turning. By strangling the trade unions Pretoria would immediately antagonize the business world.

"In the past few years there has also been a notable shift in emphasis in the repression policy. Previously trade union leaders were dealt with ruthlessly. Just think of the death during imprisonment of the white trade union leader Neil Aggett. But the economic situation has changed drastically and along with that also the attitude of the white business world, which is starting to exert pressure on its own political leaders. At the moment a few trade union leaders are still being detained, but they are primarily representatives of the more politically oriented unions which operate primarily from black neighborhoods. The large industrial trade unions are handled more carefully."

#### Political Dimension

[Question] Aren't you precisely putting your finger on the weak spot of COSATU: the internal differences in opinion on the extent of politicizing?

[Khumalo] "The sharpest edges of that discussion have meanwhile worn out, partly because of the recent developments in South Africa. More and more trade union leaders have become convinced that in the South African context every action unavoidably involves a political dimension.

"The resistance cannot stop at the factory gate. Blacks are oppressed not only as workers, but especially as citizens, where they have to deal with separate living areas, travel limitations, the continuous threat of losing the South African citizenship. Just put yourself in the place of the migrant workers, those who come from the homelands and live in the cities. They are not permitted to bring their families along. They are forced to live in inhospitable, almost hostile shelters. The resistance to these wretched circumstances is a political protest. But that battle will have to be waged by the migrant workers themselves, and I challenge any trade union which dares to claim that such a matter falls outside of the union framework."

[Question] The argument that every action in South Africa has a political dimension does not remove the fact that there are limits. That was experienced by the NUM miners' union in September, when a strike had to be called off after one day. The workers, who were threatened with dismissal, opted instead for food on the shelf.

[Khumalo] "The NUM committed a strategic blunder. When you declare war on the enemy, you must do that without any conditions. Then you cannot exclude one group from the struggle. And that is what happened in September. The workers at Anglo-American did not go on strike because agreement had been reached there. With that, the position of the NUM weakened. The Anglo-American group should have taken part in the strike out of solidarity. The solidarity of workers is the strongest political weapon we have."

[Question] Yet, the NUM affair looks like an example of COSATU's dilemma. How far can one go with the political mobilization of workers if it is coupled with the loss of work, thus with the loss of possibilities to keep yourself and your family alive?

[Khomalu] "You are right, of course, there are conflicting interests," says Khumalo impatiently. "But they have been stirred up artificially, and they are being passionately exploited by the big business world and by Pretoria. We must arm ourselves against that. I admit that it will be a long struggle, be it only because out of 6 to 7 laborers not even 1 million are organized. But I am convinced that a trade union in South Africa should operate as politically as possible.

"I am from Mamelodi, where on 21 November 17 people--and not 13 as claimed by the police--were shot to death. The tension can be cut with a knife in Mamelodi. It would not surprise me at all if the emergency situation is proclaimed there as well shortly. Can a laborer from Mamelodi justify himself toward society if he acts only as a worker, and not as an irate father, a fighter against apartheid? Every black worker is morally obliged to cross the boundaries into political activism."

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SOUTH AFRICA

TWO COMMENTATORS DISCUSS FUTURE OF REFORM

Liberals Urged To Fight Back

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Mar 86 p 23

[Article by Ken Owen]

[Text]

**M**ANY white South Africans voted for the tricameral constitution because they thought its unintended consequences would take reform farther than President Botha or the National Party would voluntarily go.

A few of us voted against it because we thought the price would be too high, that it was a dangerous way to reform and that "unintended consequences" were as likely to be retrogressive as progressive.

Both groups have been proved correct.

Reform has gone farther than anything which was publicly stated, and perhaps beyond anything privately envisaged, by the Nationalists in 1983. By recognising the permanence of urban blacks, the National Party has (oh, irony of ironies!) adopted the view of the Fagan commission against which it campaigned in 1948.

It has found its way back to the main policy assumption of the United Party.

If you believe whites are indistinguishable (seen one, seen 'em all), then you will no doubt be unimpressed; but if you believe, as most opponents of the Nationalists did in 1948, that their victory was a catastrophe for the nation — as an electoral victory for Mr Jaap Marais would be now — then you must admit that much has changed since Mr P W Botha became Prime Minister.

**T**he central structures of apartheid remain intact, but the Verwoerdian logic of the policy has gone, and with it the cohesion that made it such a formidable doctrine to challenge by conventional political methods. Change has created opportunities for change.

At the same time, there have been some quite awful "unintended consequences", in white communities and black.

On the right wing there has been a burst of mindless violence against black people. Four episodes of random attacks on blacks by whites, including one barbarous slaughter of a man by fire, have occurred in the vicinity of Johannesburg in the past few weeks. This atavistic spirit, moreover, is finding political expression in the coalescence of rightwing groups.

That's one side of the coin.

The other side is the appalling effect which the tricameral constitution, the false promise of reform, has had on the black communities. The principal change wrought by Mr Botha's limited reforms has been to raise the political awareness and the anger of black people until it outweighs all the good of "unintended consequences".

There is really no need to spell it out in detail; black rage has been the story of the past 18 months.

**T**he revolutionary left, armed with a mature theory of change which seeks to predetermine the outcome by the methods it employs, was well prepared for this moment. It has moved on every front — universities, trade unions, intellectual publications, mass demonstrations, assassination, public executions, myth-making, propaganda, overseas alliances, cell organisation, and so forth — to exploit its moment of opportunity.

The reactionary right, armed with no theory at all, has similarly tried to exploit the moment, hoping to capture Mr Botha's uncertain constituency so that it can meet violence with greater violence.

In the face of these reactions, fair-minded critics of the Government must surely admit, as some foreign intelligence agencies do, that President Botha's Government has been surprisingly consistent in pursuing its own idea of reform.

Neither the threat from the right, nor the violent assault from the left, has caused any important modification of Mr Botha's programme.

The scale of violence has been appalling and its tragedy indisputable; but all informed people knew in advance that reform would bring violence. Even before the Botha reforms began, there was much talk in opposition ranks of "containable violence" that might last until the end of the century.

There were endless repetitions of the classical warnings that a repressive regime's moment of greatest danger comes when it decides to mend its ways, and so forth.

Opponents of the Nationalists, in particular, knew at every stage of the process that Mr Botha's reforms would fall miles short of satisfying the political aspirations of black South Africans, that they would polarise the society, and that they would generate conflict as the levels of aspiration and frustration rose.

The only true surprise of the past 18 months has been the speed with which the middle ground of the liberals has crumbled in the face of consequences which liberals themselves foresaw.

In fact, it turns out, they could predict events in intellectual terms but are emotionally incapable of dealing with them.

As a result the chief liberal contribution to debate is to argue, in ponderous statements of the glaringly obvious, that President Botha has no intention of making the reforms that would satisfy the black communities.

Of course not; if he tried he would be thrown out of office and we would then face the prospect of dealing with Dr Andries Treurnicht as a reincarnation — more powerful, more heavily armed, more isolated, more desperate, but just as intransigent — of that father of misfortune, Daniel Francois Malan.

**I**n any event, Mr Botha himself sees no reason to surrender what he calls "white self-determination". In that case, he told Dr Van Zyl Slabbert, "we might as well fight it out". And he has the resources to win that fight if he chooses to pay the price.

This, then, is the battleground. On one side, the African National Congress and its allies committed to violence; on the other the Nationalist-led whites ready to use violence when they feel sufficiently threatened.

Between the two is a gulf which cannot yet be bridged. The conditions for negotiation do not yet exist and to attempt the bridging is to risk becoming a Muzorewa figure, black or white.

What, then, is to be done? Intellectually, it sometimes seems to me, South Africa has only just caught up with the Europe and America of the '60s, the heady days of Mario Savio and the Filthy Speech Movement at Berkeley, or the days of Danny the Red in Paris.

The temper of the times is a compound of utopianism and violent obsession.

Debate is dominated — and the agenda is set — by people who preach Marxist ideas with innocent fervour as though Budapest and Prague never happened, and as though the self-correcting democracy of the United States is somehow a lesser institution than the barbarous militarism of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

**L**iberals suffering a collapse of nerve in the face of the pressure from the left, have begun to argue vaguely that Mr Botha is incorrigible, Parliament is irrelevant, violence is inescapable and, oh dear, hadn't we better emigrate? The sight is unedifying.

There was a time when South African liberals had the courage to fight on the retreat, to lose every battle, and yet to hang on. It's time they recovered something of that courage to exploit the new opportunities, the unintended consequences, which have been created by President Botha's reforms.

The prospects — let us be honest — are less bad than they were in the terrible days of granite apartheid under Verwoerd and Vorster.

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Mar 86 p 23

[Article by Brian Pottinger]

[Text]

**THE analogy of the racing trains is still the most compelling.**

Down the one track hauls the National Party Government and its trick of adaptive, incremental political change which it chooses to call reform.

And down the other thunders the African National Congress in time to a revolutionary agenda aimed at what it is pleased to call liberation.

Since September 1984 the tracks have been moving closer. The next few crucial months could well see a crossing — and a derailment.

The Government's agenda has moved through three uneasy and often overlapping stages.

It began with *reform through intent*; a conscious and limited adaptation of policies to meet pressing exigencies.

Examples were the rewriting of the country's labour laws to control black trade unions, marginal changes to the apartheid measures affecting sport and the introduction of the tricameral Parliament: nothing grand (in the case of the tricameral constitution it was quite the opposite), nothing visionary, a maddeningly deliberate shuffle away from the growing heat.

## Change

A second phase, *reform through unintended consequence*, followed.

The unions that were meant to be controlled by the new labour dispensation generated their own momentum that propelled them to the cutting edge of political change.

The minor adjustments to apartheid laws in a vain bid to bring back the foreign sportsmen ended by tampering with some of the key apartheid statutes.

And the tricameral Parliament? If nothing else, and more often despite rather than because of its participants, it highlighted the anachronisms and stepped up the pressure.

In rapid succession crumbled the comprehensive bans on mixed marriages and sex, mixed political parties, mixed restaurants and cinemas, and these will increasingly crumble mixed amenities and, inevitably, mixed suburbs.

Whether the Government originally intended the full consequences of the adaptations or not is irrelevant: it is happening, and with increased pace and greater subtlety might have succeeded in launching reasonably peaceful and controlled political change.

Here is the rub. The Government's chosen style of reform — a mixture of Turkish moderniser Kemal Attaturk's "reform by undefined goals" and Huntingdon's "reform by stealth" — could not handle the ferocity of its unintended consequences.

Pretoria's studied pace, geared to the concerns of its rightwing, has been stymied by the Government's own incompetency and lack of sophistication, by its inability to control State violence, by the implacability and of-

ten impracticability of black nationalist opposition and, ultimately, by the reality that after 38 years in power the Government has just about burnt out the last in national resources of money, time and patience.

## Dangerous

Thus has the country slipped into the third and most dangerous phase: *reform through confusion*.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Government's approach to black constitutional development.

Two years ago Cabinet Ministers privately insisted that under no circumstances would the Government make a declaration of intent, prescribe end goals of negotiation, propose constitutional options, set agendas or stipulate time frames.

It was, they assured, all-on-the-table politics. But Atlas shrugged and, amid the fire and fury of the townships, the Attaturk has stumbled.

In dribs and drabs throughout last year, and then definitively on January 31 this year, President Botha broke his own Rule One. His declaration of intent was impressive enough to attract Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

A week later President Botha shattered Rule Two. And his rejection of a possible black president — thus exposing the severe limits of "open-endedness" — was emphatic enough to repel Chief Buthelezi.

Rule Three and Rule Four fell by the wayside last year when the President announced that the Government would propose constitutional options which could form the basis — and thus the agendas — of discussions with black leaders.

All that remains is Rule Five: there will be no official time limits in a period of telescoping insurrectionary

time frames.

The end of the third phase of reform strategy has about been reached.

Beyond this looming point lies in the future not reform at all but either revolution of the left or, more likely, a pre-emptive counter-revolution of the right.

The critical question now is whether a Government thrown to the buffeting winds of exigency can maintain even a semblance of reform momentum in the troubled months ahead.

## Omnipotence

Enter the second locomotive.

The African National Congress, granted subterranean omnipresence by Government gag laws, and through this credited with unwarranted omnipotence, has won — by Government omission — political gains it could never have achieved by military means.

It follows an archly opportunistic strategy. When Government embarked with inflated rhetoric on reform

through intent, it laid the basis for mass resistance.

When confronted by reform through unintended consequence, it sought to ensure those consequences would be ungovernable.

And now, in reform through confusion, it hopes for an imminent conversion of that confusion into chaos and thus reform into revolution.

The ANC could, however, be heading for its first major tactical error.

A twist in the spiral of violence is now being punted in Lusaka and London on the basis that the regime is on the point of collapse. This is simply not true.

But it is true that the Government's capacity to continue with a moderate pace of reform — by intent, unintended consequence or confusion — is dependent on the level of violence the ANC seeks to unleash.

The chances of Pretoria opting for a burst of "therapeutic" repressive violence in the hope of stabilising the situation are not impossible. Many of the generals are reactive.

And if that happens — judged by the Government's inept handling of reform by unintended consequences — it will be a long and bloody slide into continuing repression and counter-violence.

Only one conclusion would then be possible: rightwing elements within the present administration, joined by other right wingers, will begin an increasingly strident counter-revolution against the present hesitant drift towards reform.

## Revolution

In seeking revolution the ANC, ironically, courts an ante-dated counter-revolution from the right.

Under those conditions the chances of any medium-term ANC political gains become nil; the loss of many lives unavoidable.

A John Kennedy adage thus has much significance for South Africa's left, the right and the merely hesitant: "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable."

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SOUTH AFRICA

## POSITIVE, NEGATIVE RESULTS OF EMERGENCY EXAMINED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 7 Mar 86 p 13

[Article by Andre Meyerowitz]

**[Text]** CAPE TOWN — The state of emergency, now ending after 230 days, was a technically successful exercise which has left South Africa frightfully diminished. Unrest had been building up for many months before President Botha shook the country and its friends abroad by imposing the emergency on July 21 last year.

Only 36 of the 300-odd magisterial districts were covered initially — in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal.

One of the immediate effects was to besiege the offices of organisations such as the United Democratic Front and Azapo and freeze their activities. A side-effect was to disrupt many other groups not even remotely connected with endangering public safety.

Over the months, as activists headed south towards Cape Town to escape the special regulations, there was much tinkering with the emergency's geographic limits.

The Government could rightly point to the fact that only a relatively small portion of the country was covered at any one time. Some whites, as far as their own comfortable lives were concerned, could even say to themselves: "What emergency?"

But large numbers of middle-class and hitherto politically apathetic people were sensitised, and the polarisation in South Africa grew.

Suddenly, troops were lining the roads which people always travelled at the end of a working day — and suddenly they became involved in community solidarity against inappropriate action by the security forces.

Such people had to "take sides".

International news cameras feasted for a while on footage of violence (the SABC much less so) until the authorities clamped down and simply banned cameras from unrest scenes.

There were suggestions that the best way to stop Americans and other foreigners from seeing police beating blacks was for the police to stop beating blacks.

But this was ignored by the authorities, who rode out the temporary storm about Press freedom, and the camera ban proved highly effective in curbing foreign coverage.

A disadvantage from the Government's point of view was that worst-available casualty figures were sometimes accepted in the absence of Press verification of

incidents.

It was also difficult during the emergency to confirm by observation that the police were using state-of-the-art techniques of unrest control, as they claimed to do.

They were frequently seen in ordinary uniforms or fatigues — but sneeze machines, water cannons and even perspex shields were not much in evidence.

What was new in their technique was use of the odd helicopter and dye-squirting machine, and of course the Caspian anti-insurgent vehicle, designed not for city streets but for the wastes of Namibia.

Since the emergency was declared, about 600 people have been killed. About 7 200 have been detained without trial and 3 600 held under permanent security legislation.

Nearly 1 000 schools were damaged or destroyed — not to mention churches, clinics, shops, liquor stores and private homes. More than 10 000 buses and private vehicles fell foul of the unrest.

Clearly, the emergency created trouble as much as it defused

trouble.

Incidents of violence continue but at present there is more "law and order" in the country than when the emergency was declared. In the sense of superficially restoring peace, therefore, the imposition of emergency measures was a successful move.

At the same time the emergency has proved to be a disaster in the sense that large sectors of the population have been politicised and mobilised not only against the Nationalist Government but also against authority and civilised norms in general.

To that extent the African National Congress can also say, from its own nefarious point of view, that the declaration of an emergency worked well.

One of the few positive things, though, is that by crystallising the unrest into the form of an emergency, the Government may have brought home to complacent whites that there is a desperately urgent need to accommodate black political interests.

And it may now be clearer to whites that a solution must lie in genuinely de-linking white self-interest, which is perfectly legitimate, from white supremacy, which is not.

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SOUTH AFRICA

## GOVERNMENT'S TRANSFER OF MOUTSE TO KWANDEBELE CRITICIZED

Johannesburg *The STAR* in English 7 Mar 86 p 13

[Article by David Braun]

[Text]

CAPE TOWN — The Government's unilateral transfer of Moutse to kwaNdebele against the wishes of its 120 000 people is surely one of the most absurd chapters in the history of apartheid.

It is a flagrant contradiction of the most central planks of President P W Botha's own reform doctrine, in that:

● Where Mr Botha pledged last August (in his Rubicon speech) that independence would not be forced upon anyone, 120 000 South Africans are being forced to become citizens of independent kwaNdebele without being afforded the right to express their views in a plebiscite.

● Where Mr Botha has said that each group has the right to its own sovereignty and self-determination, own residential areas and own schools, the people of Moutse (more than 75 percent are not Ndebeles) are lumped with 200 000 mainly Ndebeles in one political unit. They fear for their language and property rights. They are worried about the education of their children in their own schools. Their womenfolk lose their majority status in terms of kwaNdebele law. They may not vote and are treated as minors.

● Where Mr Botha has announced that South African citizenship is to be restored to millions of blacks who lost theirs in the process of homeland independence, the people of Moutse stand to lose theirs when they are converted to citizens of independent kwaNdebele.

### **Passports for travel**

They may retain dual citizenship in the form of a South African passport for travel purposes. But in terms of Government policy, citizens of independent homelands have no claim to political rights in South Africa.

The man who made the "non-reversible" decision to draw the kwaNdebele boundaries around Moutse was President Botha. He did so because

without Moutse, kwaNdebele would be an independent state of 200 000 people and very little infrastructure — not even a hospital.

With Moutse, kwaNdebele gains 66 000 well-developed hectares, tarred roads, a telecommunications system, at least 58 schools, churches of most denominations, and a hospital.

There is also the prospect of mineral wealth. One of the farms in the Moutse 1 District is reported to be rich in minerals, and a major mining house has applied for prospecting rights.

Moutse, near Groblersdal in the Northern Transvaal, is divided into three sections, known as Areas 1, 2 and 3.

About half its 120 000 population are North Sothos. The rest include Southern Ndebeles, Swazis, Zulus, Shangaans, Tswanas, Xhosas and Vendas.

### **Medium of instruction**

In language and culture, Moutse belongs to the North Sotho group. All its chiefs are Sothos; 16 of the 20 members of the Moutse Regional Authority are Sothos; and 40 of the district's 46 primary schools use Sotho as their medium of instruction.

Because of its association with the North Sotho group, Moutse became part of the Lebowa Territorial Authority in 1962 and of the self-governing Lebowa Legislative Assembly in 1972.

From 1972 to 1980, Moutse was part of Lebowa, a separate self-governing homeland for the North Sotho unit. It had four seats in the Lebowa Legislative Assembly. In 1979 the Government decided to include the South Ndebele as a unit entitled to self-government. Previously, the unit was considered too small for statehood and the South Ndebeles were expected to achieve their political aspirations in other units.

Because kwaNdebele opted for independence, Pretoria started giving the tiny homeland preferential treatment, particularly when it came to the allocation of land. In 1980, in what later tran-

spired to be preparation for kwaNdebele's independence, Pretoria unilaterally excised Moutse from Lebowa.

The people and leaders of Moutse voiced their opposition to the proposed incorporation of their territory into kwaNdebele from the outset. They have called repeatedly for a referendum.

In September last year, the Government published the consolidation plans for kwaNdebele. They included Moutse.

The territory's residents tried to express their opposition to the plan through public meetings, but these were either banned or dispersed by the police.

On December 31, President Botha issued Proclamation 227 of 1985 incorporating Moutse into kwaNdebele. It sparked a violent confrontation between the people of Moutse and kwaNdebele.

## **Initiation ceremonies**

In January, Mr Godfrey Mathebe, a Moutse leader and Member of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, was detained under the Internal Security Act.

The people of Moutse fear that if they are forced to live in independent kwaNdebele their way of life will be changed. They fear that kwaNdebele will impose Ndebele as the official language. Moutse schools will fall under the kwaNdebele Department of Education, so Ndebele standards are likely to be imposed.

The Ndebeles may also introduce their system of public flogging of adults. They might even nationalise Moutse properties.

Professor John Dugard, legal adviser to the Moutse people, on whose research much of this article has been based, says that the incorporation of Moutse into kwaNdebele is a new and insidious form of resettlement.

"Pretoria realises that any attempt to forcibly relocate the people of Moutse to Immerspan and Saliesloot would be met with an international

outcry. Thus it has resorted to another strategy to achieve the same goal. It has redrawn the boundaries of kwaNdebele so as to include Moutse.

## **Welfare responsibility**

"The people of Moutse are thus resettled in a new black state-to-be by the stroke of a legislative pen, absolving Pretoria of responsibility for their welfare.

"If the people of Moutse find living conditions in kwaNdebele intolerable, and later elect to move to Immerspan and Saliesloot, Pretoria will claim that they have voluntarily elected to relocate. This scheme must be seen for what it is: a new species of resettlement."

The Moutse people are bitter about leaving their ancestors and their home of 200 years. In any case, they say, the ground offered to them is too far away from the white towns, to which many commute to work.

With the aid of Professor Dugard and the Progressive Federal Party, a plan to air the whole issue in each of the three chambers of Parliament came close to working this week.

If the coloured and Indian Houses had disapproved the President's Proclamation of December 31, the Government would have been in a difficult and embarrassing position.

However, a court action instituted by Lebowa (which after agreeing to swap Moutse for other goodies from Pretoria, has lately taken up the cudgels for its erstwhile citizens) put paid to this. The Speaker has ruled that until the court has decided on the matter, it must remain sub judice and may not be debated.

Meanwhile Moutse has turned to foreign ambassadors and the world Press for help.

Said one official at a Press conference in Cape Town this week: "We are fighting for our survival. Whoever can come to our aid is welcome. We don't ask for sympathy, just understanding."

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SOUTH AFRICA

ALEXANDRA'S BACKGROUND EXAMINED, MAYOR BUTI CRITICIZED

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 2 Mar 86 p 14

[Article by Mike Sarakinsky of University of Witwatersrand]

[Text]

JON QWELANE claimed in The Sunday Star last week that had it not been for Sam Mr Buti and his Save Alexandra Party (SAP) the township would have been reduced to rubble a few years ago to make way for a vast complex of multi-storey single sex hostels.

This is a claim made by Mr Buti and is, in fact, a very misleading claim.

To be sure, Mr Buti and his SAP did mount a campaign against the planned demolition of Alex and its replacement with eight hostels. But they were not the only ones.

Over the years since the plan was announced in 1963 a number of organisations and individuals campaigned against the proposals.

These included the United Party, the Kew-Wynberg Industrialists and Traders Association, the SA Institute of Race Relations, the Johannesburg City Council, the Bishop of Johannesburg, the Alexandra Stand Holders Protection and Vigilance Association, the Black Sash, the Citizens Hostel Action Committee, the Progressive Party and some newspapers.

By the time Alex was "reprieved" in May 1979, it had become clear that there were structural constraints on the implementation of the plan. The plan was to demolish all the houses, remove all the families to Soweto

and Tembisa, and to convert Alex into a hostel township for single migrant workers.

By December 1977, however, Wrab had suspended the plan owing to lack of funds. By March 1979 the necessary finance had not materialised and the suspension was extended.

In the wake of the 1976 uprisings, a shift in State policy regarding urban Africans began.

In 1977 the Community Councils Act was passed replacing the old Urban Bantu Councils with new forms of local government. In 1978 legislation providing for 99-year leasehold for Africans in the urban townships was passed. In 1979 the shift was formally announced when the State accepted many of the recommendations of the Riekert Commission.

For our purposes here, the gist of these recommendations was that certain categories of blacks were now officially recognised as permanently urbanised.

In other words not all blacks were "temporary sojourners" in the urban areas. It was this group whose "quality of life" was to be improved in the hope of creating a politically stable, relatively privileged "black middle class".

Improved housing was to be a major factor in this new strategy of "divide and rule".

Alexandra was a prime target for this strategy. There were logistical reasons why it could not be demolished, and it could form part of the State's new strategy

regarding Africans. If only they could find a popular leader who could be co-opted.

Enter Sam Mr Buti.

It is incorrect for Mr Buti, and Qwelane to suggest that Mr Buti's heroic struggle against "the might of officialdom" was solely responsible for the reprieve of Alex.

It is part of the mythology produced by Mr Buti to try to salvage his declining popularity. This decline in popularity is not one of the "greatest ironies of South African history".

Not is it simply because he "opted to participate in the unpopular black local authorities system". It is easily explained by Mr Buti's own activities since 1979.

Mr Buti's record is one of broken promises and violations of the SAP constitution. The Alexandra Liaison Committee was said by him to be a group formed to protect the property owners' rights to land ownership.

It should be pointed out that only a small minority of Alex residents were property owners. The majority were tenants paying exorbitant rentals to their property-owning landlords. It was the right to charge exorbitant rentals that the Act was in fact protecting.

As soon as he had got himself into power, Mr Buti dumped his property-owning constituency. In 1980 the ALC said that "every stand-holder must co-operate with Wrab's request to acquire his property".

In May 1979 Mr Buti boldly stated that "no-one should be victimised because he or she didn't have a residential permit".

After their victory at the polls the SAP promised to build a new Alex where all the people would be living in comfortable homes — even the poor and the old.

Another point was that the SAP declared itself against the concept of "legal and illegal" blacks.

But as a recognised local authority, the SAP has not put its non-existent money where its mouth is. In 1981 it was announced that "illegals" were no longer allowed to live in Alexandra.

Squatter shacks were destroyed with the explanation that the ALC had no obligation to provide shelter for people who were "not

bona-fides of the township. They were people who had just streamed from nowhere".

They were told to return from whence they came, the homelands which the SAP had opposed.

Before the 1981 elections it was announced that people in arrears with their rent or who did not produce their passbook and housing permit would not be allowed to vote.

The total number of votes cast in the election was 4 804 of which the SAP won 4 500. This was in a township whose population has been estimated at between 80 000 and 100 000.

The SAP election ticket was the "redevelopment" of the township. This involved the demolition of all derelict housing and its replacement with new houses, flats, an hotel, a technikon, parks, sports-fields, a CBD, etc.

So far so good. However, it is clear that housing for not more than about 50 000 people is planned.

Where are the more than 30 000 others to go? How are the new houses to be allocated?

People whose houses have been demolished are removed (forcibly if necessary) into overcrowded and unfavourable conditions.

I will give only three examples. In August 1982, 16 families were removed and placed in five houses.

In August 1983, people whose houses were demolished were placed in derelict Putco buses, and shortly thereafter 23 families were removed to an old dilapidated TB hospital.

Some of those whose houses were demolished were "fortunate" enough to be moved into new houses. Their joy was short-lived when they were told their rentals had increased from about R12,50 a month to about R130.

If they could not afford these rents they were told to swap with someone in an old house who could. Obviously there is going to come a time when there are no longer any old houses to swap with.

Socio-economic surveys of Alex show that the vast majority of the population cannot afford these rentals. What are they to do?

It is clear that the new housing in Alex is designed for the more affluent "black middle class".

Redevelopment, it seems, is only for the rich. For the poor it means expulsion from Alex. Given the acknowledged housing shortage in the townships, where are the poorer residents to go?

This is why Mr Buti is regarded as a "dictator" and an "oppressor" in Alex today.

Placards at anti-Buti demonstrations read, "Buti, West Rand, stop humiliating the people", "Bosses pay us peanuts, Buti charges us the world", "Is Alex only meant for the rich?" and "High rent is oppression".

Against this backdrop, the 1983 elections were boycotted by the two opposition parties, Cosas, the Alexandra Youth Congress, and others. Mr Buti opportunistically claimed that the SAP were elected unopposed.

"Once again," he said, "this is a very clear indication of the confidence the residents of Alexandra have in their leadership.

"The victory is a clear mandate from the residents for us to go on with even greater confidence to seek a better quality of life for them."

This "better quality of life" has meant demolitions, forced removals, overcrowding, buses, expulsions, and high rentals.

A "very clear indication of the confidence the residents of Alexandra have" in the SAP and Mr Buti can be gauged, from two recent events in the township.

Last year Mr Buti's house was bombed and burnt to the ground.

Recent legislation makes provision for black local authorities to establish their own military corps. Mr Buti has been quick to take advantage of this.

But in spite of this, and the presence of the SAP (this time the South African Police) and the SADF, Mr Buti was forced to flee from Alex into Sandton.

Mr Buti once said that the SAP wanted to serve Alex "as servants and not as leaders". He was correct about being somebody's servant, but it is certainly not the vast majority of Alex residents.

Mr Buti's lack of popular support can be seen to be somewhat more than simply "ironic".

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SOUTH AFRICA

**JOHANNESBURG-PRETORIA METROBLITZ TRAIN TO BE SCRAPPED**

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 26 Feb 86 p 1

[Article by Zenaide Vendeiro and Sue Dobson]

[Text]

South Africa's experiment with high speed trains has come to an ignominious end with the disclosure that the R14.5-million Metroblitz train will probably be scrapped.

The two Metroblitz trainsets, the fastest on narrow gauge in the world, were quietly withdrawn from service in November last year and are standing at Koedoespoort in Pretoria while their fate is decided.

A South African Transport Services spokesman yesterday said a committee investigating possible future uses of the locomotives and the 24 coaches had handed a report to the Minister of Transport Affairs, Mr Hendrik Schoeman.

Questions are to be raised in Parliament about the failure of the Metroblitz and Mr Schoeman is then expected to reveal the proposals made by the committee and announce his decision.

**SALVAGE**

A senior Railways official, who did not want to be identified, said he believed SATS would salvage whatever compo-

nents it could from the coaches and then scrap them.

The SATS spokesman confirmed that while the locomotives could be used on other trains with minor adjustments, the coaches were specially designed for the Metroblitz and could not be used on other trains.

Another source in the Railways said the withdrawal of the train had been "kept low profile" to avoid controversy.

When the Metroblitz was inaugurated on the Johannesburg-Pretoria route in January 1984, it was hailed as the beginning of a new era in transportation.

It covered the distance between the two cities in 42 minutes at speeds of between 120 and 160 km/h.

The Metroblitz was technically successful, but it was an embarrassing financial disaster.

It had only 480 seats compared to the 2 000 seats on normal commuter trains and, at its peak, only achieved an occupancy rate of between 75 and 78 percent. Moreover, more than 30 percent of its passengers were SATS employees travelling to and from work on free passes.

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SOUTH AFRICA

## ESCOM TO CUT 6,000 JOBS

East London DAILY DISPATCH in English 15 Feb 86 p 7

[Text]

**EAST LONDON —**  
**Escom is to cut back on 6 000 jobs by the end of the year as part of a drive to streamline the company.**

The current staff of 66 000 will be reduced to 60 000.

The national restructuring of Escom will see three key changes embodied in the new structure, affecting the Eastern Cape region and others.

Escom's head office will be streamlined and the engineering sector reorganised. The two major functions of generation and distribution will be separated and strategic business units, of a size which can be managed effectively, will be established.

The previous six geographic regions which were responsible for both generation and distribution have been replaced by a generation structure consisting of 29 power stations grouped into five genera-

tion divisions and a distribution structure consisting of 12 regions grouped into two divisions.

The first phase of the new structure became effective on January 1 this year, and the final structure will be fully implemented by December 1989.

Commenting on how the changes would affect the Eastern Cape, Escom's Eastern Cape regional manager, Mr Ken Garman, said here yesterday:

"We must bear in mind the main purpose of the reorganisation, which is to form strategic business units. These units will be run as far as is practical along business lines.

"We will adopt a more business-like attitude, coupled with greater awareness of our customers' needs," he added.

Mr Garman explained that as a result of the decision to split the generation and distribution functions, the power stations in the Eastern

Cape would form a business unit on their own.

This included the West Bank and Port Rex power stations in East London, plus the two hydro stations on the Orange River, Hendrik Verwoerd and Van Der Kloof.

Heading this business unit would be Mr Hans Pennells, resident in East London.

The Eastern Cape region would then form an other business unit which would control the distribution of electricity in the Eastern Cape with the headquarters remaining in East London. The function of the region would then be to purchase power from the generation division and distribute it to Escom's customers in the area.

Mr Garman said to cope with the large Eastern Cape region, of over 200 000 square kilometres, Escom had divi-

ded the region into two areas, each headed by an area manager.

These managers would form part of the regional management team together with other heads of department and would be stationed in East London.

"Their duties will be to ensure the smooth functioning of the distribution process which will be handled through four district offices, each headed by a district manager," Mr Garman said.

The East London and Colesberg districts will report to the East London area manager, Mr Bernard Lindstrom, while Uitenhage and Grahamstown districts will report to the Port Elizabeth area manager, Mr Lindsay Carswell.

The district managers' offices will be situated in the towns mentioned and their main function will be to provide customer service.

"We will delegate authority to the district managers so they can deal with most of the customers' needs right on the spot.

"The purpose is to reduce the long lines of communication which have tended to give Escom a bureaucratic image. We would like the district manager to be seen as 'Mr Escom' in his district," Mr Garman explained.

Mr Garman also emphasised Escom's move from a sales approach to a marketing approach.

"This means a greater sensitivity and awareness of the needs of the customers, both existing and potential. This also means meeting the customer's needs in the best manner we can," he said.

Mr Garman said as part of the new marketing function, Escom would also encourage load management and energy conservation.

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SOUTH AFRICA

## RESEARCH FUNDING PRIORITIES QUESTIONED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 18 Feb 86 p 6

[Article by Charles Parry]

[Text]

**SOUTH AFRICANS** working on industrial research are allegedly being denied funds because "boffins" get more money to explore pure science.

And SA's Pretoria-based Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is castigated for being preoccupied with scientific as opposed to industrial research in the *South Africa Journal of Science* by Professor Richard Dutkiewicz, of Cape Town University.

Dutkiewicz believes that research in SA must be more community-orientated and of potential or actual benefit to industry. He says a research-funding policy which aims to allow some of our scientists to keep up with Nobel prizewinners at the expense of solving some basic problems is ill-advised.

Dutkiewicz blames the policy implemented by the CSIR Foundation for Research and Development (FDR) in 1985, whereby funding is based on the "rating" of a researcher.

According to Dutkiewicz, the number of publications in reputable international journals is the highest contributing factor in assessing a candidate's "rating".

### Advantage

He claims that basic scientists have an advantage, as "people who are working on, say, methods of improving industrial productivity in local industry are unlikely to make any impact on the international scene but are more valuable to SA than those probing the origin of the Universe".

However, Dr Reinhard Arndt, Director of the FDR, said it was incorrect to say that a researcher would be penalised for concentrating on local development.

Under the new funding scheme, researcher's ratings were determined by peer review. Each field of research could nominate its own assessors. Hence, the criteria for assessing the rating of a mathematician and an engineer are different. After the peer review there was a final determination of the overall relative ratings.

Dutkiewicz compared the findings of the government White Paper on Industrial Development Strategy with the new FDR scheme. The White Paper found that "immediate attention must be given to improvement of SA technology policy ... an intensive effort be made to increase the productivity of all resources in industry, and that this be given the highest priority when deciding on financial support".

According to Dutkiewicz, to achieve industrial growth, research must be relevant to the needs of SA as a developing country. The industrial sector is moving towards a greater reliance on manufacturing. Although the manufacturing industry has become the greatest contributor to the national product, its performance is poor in the productive use of resources and its contribution to the balance of payments.

The White Paper says the industrial field in SA is largely dependent on imported technology and research, and

development expenditure is relatively small. There is a shortage of experts for the creation, adaptation and use of the most suitable technology. Researchers should become geared to the demands of the market and work situation.

Although researchers are rated into three categories, individuals are positioned on a sliding scale of merit that determines their maximum amount of funding.

In the top two categories — A and B — a researcher receives comprehensive support, including allocations for salaries, travel and minor equipment. This support is guaranteed for five years. The amount awarded is dependent, first, on the limit determined by the researcher's grading, and then on an assessment of the project's cost.

Hence, a researcher may have a limit of R300 000, based on his rating, but may only be awarded R100 000 as the estimated project cost.

In the C category, researchers receive partial CSIR funding for materials only, and not travel or staff. The support is 50% of the proposed project costs, again up to the limit set by his rating. The other half would be supplied by the university.

Researchers who do not qualify for any rating have to rely on universities for all funding. As institutional resources are limited, researchers have to compete according to the individual university policy.

Analysis of the CSIR assessment of researchers shows engineering researchers (who tend to be more concerned with applied research) compare poorly with their colleagues in the basic sciences (chemistry, physics, maths and statistics).

Of all the successful applicants for evaluation, 8% were from engineering. If just basic science and engineering are considered, then engineering forms 15% of the total number of successful applicants.

Some 55% of engineering candidates fail to achieve a rating, compared to 35% of basic scientists.

## More funding

In terms of actual numbers, there are only 39 rated engineering researchers, compared with 227 rated basic scientists. Of a total of 35 researchers from all fields in the top rating category, three are from engineering. Physics has the most top-rated scientists with 11.

Because of the low number of rated engineers compared with basic scientists (39 as opposed to 227), pure research will continue to receive more funding than applied research under the FDR scheme.

However, Dutkiewicz has considered only the FDR scheme, which is based purely on the researcher's merit. This is only one of several outlets for CSIR research funding, and in 1985 amounted to R9m.

Examination of CSIR spending shows applied research — in particular engineering — receives the lion's


share of the budget. The latest CSIR annual report, published in 1985, shows research and development (R&D) received 68% of the R156m research expenditure. Engineering received the largest allocation: 29.7%.

When the R&D expenditure is divided into socio-economic sectors, the contribution to the manufacturing sector was 21.3%.

In addition to state funds, the private sector also donates directly to specific university projects. While this funding is for both pure and applied research, it is certainly directed where industry feels that it is most needed.

To improve funding in applied research, attention should be given to the CSIR's other schemes. Many of these work closely with both the academic and industrial sectors.

SA scientists, whatever field they are in, are valuable assets. The FDR scheme is a fair means of rewarding them directly for their achievements.



SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

27,000 JOB CUT IN BUILDING INDUSTRY--More than 27 000 jobs have disappeared in the building industry since 1982. According to the latest statistics from the Central Statistical Services in Pretoria, the number of people employed in the building industry peaked at 279 000 in March 1982. In August last year the figure was 251 800. The official journal of the Building Industries Federation reports the greatest reduction of jobs occurred among black employees in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories. Although the pace of retrenchments had declined, prospects for 1986 were still uncertain. A survey of labour costs revealed the average annual wage increases for artisans in the period 1975 and 1984 were 12,4 percent and 15,2 percent respectively. The rate of inflation over that period was 12,8 percent. In 1984 the average nominal earnings of whites in the building industry was R18 700 a year compared with R3 924 for blacks, R6 773 for coloured people and R11 185 for Indians. Estimated average wage increases this year would be eight to 10 percent. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 4 Mar 86 p 5] /9317

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